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 Abstract 
My research focuses primarily on industrial organization and applied microeconomics.  
Specifically, I have extensively studied the airline industry. 
My first essay considers the effect of the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance.  
Codeshare agreements can benefit airlines due to network expansion and benefit consumers by 
eliminating a double markup on flight itineraries with multiple operating carriers.  However, 
policymakers have expressed concern that an alliance between airlines may facilitate price and 
service collusion in markets where codeshare partners’ services overlap.  I develop a structural 
econometric model that is able to separately identify supply and demand factors as sources of 
price-quantity changes caused by the creation of the alliance.  The estimates from the model 
show both collusive and demand increasing effects associated with the codeshare alliance.  
However, the demand increasing effect is larger than the collusive effect. 
My second essay considers the effects of the recent Delta/Northwest merger.  This 
merger is of particular interest because the two airlines are codeshare partners.  Using pre-merger 
data, a counterfactual simulation is performed in which Delta and Northwest are assumed to 
merge.  The results indicate that codeshare products owned by the merging firms experience 
higher predicted price increases relative to pure online products.  In addition, the mean predicted 
price increases are relatively small across most markets.  I also examine pre-merger predictions 
with post-merger data and analysis and find that the pre-merger predictions roughly accord with 
“de-merger” simulated effects using post-merger data. 
My third essay takes an extended look at airline mergers.  When the Delta/Northwest 
merger was approved by the Department of Justice, consumer groups and policymakers were 
concerned that the merger and poor economic outlook would act as a catalyst for more mergers.  
This paper examines this possible scenario using simulations to model the effects of other 
codeshare partners merging in addition to Delta and Northwest.  Results indicate that the 
predicted price increases for all mergers exhibit relatively small averages but large variances 
across markets.  Further, the largest predicted price increases affect a small percent of products 
and an even smaller percent of passengers who choose products owned by a merging firm. 
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 CHAPTER 1 - Airline Strategic Alliances in Overlapping Markets: 
Should Policymakers be Concerned? 
1.1  INTRODUCTION  
Policy analysts have expressed skepticism when reviewing airlines' applications to form a 
codeshare alliance in the event that such an alliance involves potential partners that have 
significant overlap in their route networks.  The heart of the concern is that these potential 
partners are direct competitors in the segments of their networks that overlap, and an alliance 
between them, which often requires broad discussions between partners to make their interline1 
service seamless, could facilitate collusion (explicit or tacit) on prices and/or service levels in the 
partners' overlapping markets.  Before ultimately approving the Delta/Continental/Northwest 
alliance, which was formed in June 2003, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 
expressed these concerns.2  The DOT's review of this proposed alliance points out that the three 
airlines' service overlap in 3,214 markets accounting for approximately 58 million annual 
passengers, which is in contrast to the next largest alliance between United Airlines and US 
Airways with overlapping service in only 543 markets accounting for 15.1 million annual 
passengers.  So unlike much of the earlier literature that focuses on international airline alliances 
[Brueckner (2003), Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Bilotkach (2007)], we focus on a U.S. 
domestic alliance [Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2004), Armantier and Richard (2006), 
Armantier and Richard (2008), Ito and Lee (2007)]. 
The central question that this paper sets out to answer is: Has the 
Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance reduced competition between these carriers in their 
overlapping markets?  Using a reduced-form econometric model similar to that in Bamberger, 
Carlton and Neumann (2004), Gayle (2008) has shed some light on this question.  In particular, 
Gayle (2008) found that the alliance is associated with a marginal price increase, which by itself 
points to possible collusive effects.  But a marginal price increase is also consistent with 
increased demand, and there is good reason to believe that an alliance has a demand-increasing 
                                                 
1 Interline means that at some point in the trip when passengers change planes they also change airlines. 
2 See "Termination of review under 49U.S.C. § 41720 of Delta/Northwest/Continental Agreements," published by 
Office of the Secretary, Department of Transportation, January 2003. 
1 
effect associated with it.  For example, passengers that are members of an airline's frequent-flyer 
program may cumulatively earn and redeem frequent-flyer miles across any partner in the 
alliance.  The new opportunities for passengers to earn and redeem miles will likely increase 
demand for the alliance partners' products.  In fact, Gayle (2008) also found that the alliance is 
associated with increased traffic (measured by number of passengers), a finding which casts 
doubt on the effectiveness of collusive behavior if at all present. 
It is important to note however, that Gayle's (2008) conjecture about the possible absence 
of collusive effects is based on the estimated change in equilibrium price and quantity over the 
pre- and post-alliance periods.  While the approach is an informative and suggestive first step, it 
is not definitive in regards to ruling out collusive effects unless we are able to disentangle the 
demand and supply sources of the equilibrium price-quantity changes.  In other words, we cannot 
be certain that the price and quantity increases are solely driven by demand-increasing factors of 
the codeshare alliance.  If collusive effects are also present, then the quantity increase is smaller 
and price increase larger than they would have been were it not for collusion.  So the main 
contribution of our present paper is to derive and estimate a structural econometric model that 
allows us to disentangle the demand and supply sources of equilibrium price-quantity changes 
that are associated with a codeshare alliance.  Second, the ability to do welfare analysis in a 
straightforward way is another advantage of the structural econometric model in this paper 
compared to the reduced-form econometric model in Gayle (2008).  Third, since our econometric 
model can be applied to study the market effects of codeshare alliances other than the 
Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance, this paper contributes to the methodology of analyzing the 
competitive effects of codeshare alliances. 
Our key findings are as follows:  First, the econometric estimates for the air travel 
demand equation suggest that the Delta/Continental/Northwest alliance has a demand-increasing 
effect associated with it.  Second, the econometric estimates for the air travel supply equation 
suggest that the alliance is associated with a softening of competition between the three airlines 
in their overlapping markets relative to competition between other competing airlines in these 
markets.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly isolate and find 
evidence of a collusive effect associated with a domestic codeshare alliance. 
We must point out that we are not the first to present a structural econometric model to 
examine codeshare alliances.  Armantier and Richard (2008) also use a structural econometric 
2 
model to examine a codeshare alliance.  However, a fundamental difference between our model 
and the model in Armantier and Richard (2008) is that we model both demand and supply 
aspects of codesharing, while Armantier and Richard (2008) only model the demand side.  This 
crucial methodological difference affords us the advantage of being able to separately identify 
demand and supply effects of codesharing, which further allows us to more meticulously 
examine short-run market effects within a market equilibrium framework. 
For example, we use our model to perform counterfactual experiments by removing the 
demand-increasing and collusive effects of the alliance to see how the partners' equilibrium 
prices, number of passengers, and consumer surplus would be affected.  These experiments 
reveal that the demand-increasing and collusive effects of codesharing reinforce each other in 
their influence of the partners' prices, with collusive effects accounting for a larger portion of the 
relatively small price increases in the case of the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare 
alliance.  On the other hand, the demand-increasing and collusive effects of codesharing oppose 
each other in their influence on the partners' number of passengers, with the demand-increasing 
effect dominating and leading to increases in the partners' number of passengers.  The 
experiments also reveal that the codeshare alliance seems to have improved consumer surplus 
owing to the domination of demand-increasing effects over collusive effects, which should be 
reassuring to policymakers who approved the alliance. 
Armantier and Richard (2008) examine the effects on consumer surplus resulting from 
the earlier Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance implemented in 1999.  They find that the 
Continental/Northwest alliance increased the welfare of passengers on connecting flights but 
decreased the welfare of passengers on nonstop flights, which resulted in no significant impact 
on overall consumer surplus.  However, there is a fundamental difference in how we simulate 
and measure welfare effects versus how these effects are measured in Armantier and Richard 
(2008).  Essentially, Armantier and Richard (2008) use their demand model to estimate and 
compare consumer surplus in the pre- and post-alliance periods in markets where the two airlines 
codeshare versus markets in which the two airlines do not codeshare.  Thus, any temporal change 
in consumer surplus that is different across codeshare versus non-codeshare markets is attributed 
to the alliance.  In our approach, we first econometrically identify both demand and supply 
effects of codesharing, which then gives us the advantage of performing well-controlled 
counterfactual welfare experiments.  For example, in one counterfactual experiment we hold 
3 
market conditions in the post-alliance period constant and simulate new market equilibria in the 
event that only the demand-increasing effect of codesharing is artificially removed.  As such, for 
a given market at a given point in time, by comparing actual market equilibrium to simulated 
market equilibrium, we can assess how consumer surplus would change if only the demand-
increasing effect of codesharing is removed. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  In the next section we make some key 
definitions which build the foundation for important issues we subsequently model, analyze, and 
discuss.  In Section 1.3 we present the structural econometric model, while the estimation 
strategy is discussed in Section 1.4.  We discuss the characteristics of our data in Section 1.5 and 
results are shown and discussed in Section 1.6.  Concluding remarks are offered in Section 1.7. 
1.2.  DEFINITIONS 
A market is defined as directional round-trip air travel between an origin and a 
destination city during a particular period.  The assumption that markets are directional implies 
that a round-trip air travel from Atlanta to Detroit is a distinct market compared to round-trip air 
travel from Detroit to Atlanta.  Furthermore, this directional assumption allows for the possibility 
that origin city characteristics may influence market demand [see Gayle (2007a, 2007b, 2007c), 
Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006)]. 
A flight itinerary is defined as a specific sequence of airport stops while traveling from 
the origin to destination city.  An air travel product is defined as a unique combination of 
airline(s) and flight itinerary.  Following Ito and Lee (2007), a pure online product means that the 
same airline markets and operates all segments of a round trip.  For example, three separate pure 
online products are: (1) a non-stop round trip from Atlanta to Detroit marketed and operated by 
Delta Air Lines; (2) a round trip from Atlanta to Detroit with one stop in Minneapolis marketed 
and operated by Delta Air Lines; and (3) a non-stop round trip from Atlanta to Detroit marketed 
and operated by Northwest Air Lines.  Note that all three products are in the same market. 
A codeshare agreement effectively allows one carrier (called the "ticketing carrier" or 
"marketing carrier") to sell seats on its partners' planes as if these seats are owned by the carrier 
selling the seats.  The carrier whose plane that actually transports the passenger is referred to as 
the "operating carrier".  For example, Northwest may sell tickets for a subset of seats on the 
Delta operated flight between Atlanta and Detroit as if the plane were owned by Northwest.  So a 
4 
passenger that uses a codeshare itinerary may have purchased the round trip ticket from 
Northwest, but actually flies on a Delta plane. 
The type of codeshare product we focus on in this research is referred to as "virtual" 
codeshare.3  A passenger using a virtual codeshare itinerary remains on a single operating 
carrier's plane(s) for the entire round trip, but the ticket for the trip was marketed and sold by a 
partner ticketing carrier.  We focus on virtual codeshare products because Gayle (2008) found 
that this was the only type of codeshare product that is strongly associated with price increases. 
Figure 1.1 gives an example in which two airlines' route networks overlap, and they may 
virtual codeshare together in the origin-destination market.  The figure shows that Northwest and 
Delta both operate non-stop flights in the Atlanta to Detroit market.  If they virtual codeshare 
together in this market, then a subset of the passengers on the Delta plane would have bought 
their tickets from Northwest, while a subset of the passengers on the Northwest plane would 
have bought their tickets from Delta. 
Figure 1.1 Route Network Diagram 
 
Figure 1.2 shows an alternate situation in which the airlines' route networks may overlap.  
In Figure 1.2, Northwest operates a non-stop flight in the Atlanta to Detroit market, while Delta 
operates a one-stop itinerary in the Atlanta to Detroit market, but unlike Figure 1.1, Delta does 
                                                 
3 See Gayle (2008) and Ito and Lee (2007) for discussions of the main types of codeshare products in the U.S. 
domestic market. 
5 
not operate a non-stop flight in this market.  Northwest and Delta's networks are still considered 
to be overlapping in Figure 1.2 even though Delta operates a one-stop itinerary while Northwest 
operates a non-stop itinerary.  Both carriers may virtual codeshare together in Figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2 Modified Route Network Diagram 
 
In Figure 1.2 it might seem counter-intuitive that a passenger would choose a one-stop 
itinerary even though a non-stop flight between the origin and destination is available.  However, 
passengers often choose less convenient routes (flight itineraries that require intermediate stops) 
to get from their origin to destination when such alternate routing is competitively priced.  In 
other words, within reasonable bounds, some passengers are willing to trade-off travel itinerary 
convenience for a lower price. 
Figure 1.2 can also be used to illustrate a situation in which virtual codesharing is likely 
to have a demand-increasing effect associated with it.  In the event that Northwest and Delta do 
not have a codeshare alliance, Northwest can only offer its Atlanta-based customers (some of 
whom may be members of Northwest's frequent-flyer program) a non-stop flight to Detroit.  
However, an alliance with Delta allows Northwest to offer its Atlanta-based customers both a 
non-stop flight on its own plane and a one-stop virtual codeshare itinerary operated solely by 
Delta.  While passengers in Atlanta already had the option, prior to an alliance, to purchase either 
a pure online one-stop itinerary from Delta or a pure online non-stop flight from Northwest, 
6 
Northwest's frequent-flyers could not accumulate frequent-flyer miles on the Delta operated 
flights.  Thus, the alliance created a new opportunity for Northwest frequent-flyers to accumulate 
miles on a Delta operated one-stop itinerary.  Similarly, Delta frequent-flyers that would like to 
travel on the non-stop Northwest flight also have a new opportunity to accumulate frequent-flyer 
miles on the Northwest operated flight.  The new opportunity for passengers to accumulate 
frequent-flyer miles across partner carriers is one reason we expect a demand-increasing effect to 
be associated with a codeshare alliance.  Our econometric model is designed to isolate and test 
for this potential demand-increasing effect. 
Figure 1.2 is also illustrates the main concern that the DOT expressed in its review of the 
proposed alliance between Delta, Continental, and Northwest.  Since Delta and Northwest were 
competitors in the market shown in Figure 1.2, the DOT was concerned that forming an alliance 
could reduce how fiercely the two airlines compete with each other.  The econometric model we 
present below is designed to isolate and test how competitive interactions between the three 
airlines differed in the post-alliance period compared to the pre-alliance period. 
1.3.  MODEL 
We proceed by first describing the demand side of the model.  The supply side is then 
laid out, which is where we model competitive interactions between airlines. 
Demand 
In the spirit of Peters (2006), Berry and Jia (2009), Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006), and 
Armantier and Richard (2008), air travel demand is modeled using a discrete choice framework.  
Specifically, we use a nested logit model.4  Potential passenger i in market l during time period 
τ  faces a choice between  alternatives.  There are 1 +lJτ 1 +lJτ  alternatives because we allow 
passengers the option (j = 0, the outside good) not to choose either one of the  differentiated 
air travel products considered in the empirical model.  Since the model focuses on pure online 
lJ  τ
                                                 
4 We concede that a nested logit model is not as flexible and therefore less desirable compared to a random 
coefficients logit model.  However, it is well-known that the random coefficients model is more computationally 
demanding to estimate relative to the nested logit model.  This estimation burden becomes particularly severe in our 
case since we have a large data set and plan to jointly estimate demand and supply parameters.  As such, to make 
estimation feasible we had to choose the nested logit model over the random coefficients logit model.  In addition, it 
is subsequently shown that the supply equation is highly nonlinear in its parameters, which also makes estimation 
computationally burdensome. 
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and virtual codeshare products, the outside good includes interline air travel products, and other 
means of getting from the origin to destination city besides air travel. 
Products in a market are assumed to be organized into 1+G  exhaustive mutually 
exclusive groups, , in which the outside good, Gg ..., ,1 ,0= 0=j , is assumed to be the only 
member of group 0.  A group here refers to the set of products offered by an airline within a 
market. 
A passenger solves the following optimization problem: 
lijgliljlijJj
UMax
l
     },...,0{
)1(
 
ττττ εσσζδ
τ
−++=
∈
   (1.1) 
where  is the level of utility passenger i will obtain if product j is chosen, while lijU  τ lj  τδ  is the 
mean level of utility across passengers that consume product j.  lj  τδ  is a function of the 
characteristics of product j, which we subsequently describe. gli   τζ  is a random component of 
utility that is common to all products in group g, whereas the random term lij  τε  is specific to 
product j and is assumed to have an extreme value distribution.  The parameter σ  lies between 0 
and 1, and measures the correlation of the consumers’ utility across products belonging to the 
same group.  Since products are grouped by airlines, σ  can also be thought of as measuring the 
correlation of the consumers' utility across products offered by a given airline.  As σ  approaches 
1, the correlation of preferences among products offered by the same airline within a market 
increases.  Conversely, as σ  decreases, the correlation of preferences for products offered by the 
same airline within a market decreases. 
The rationale for the product grouping structure above is to capture the possibility that 
passengers view an airline's products as closer substitutes for each other compared to the 
substitutability of these products across airlines [Gayle (2007b)].  One reason why this could be 
the case is that a passenger may be heavily invested (accumulated miles flown) in a given 
airline's frequent-flyer program and therefore, on the margin, would prefer to choose among 
alternate flights offered by this airline in order to build up accumulated miles towards the 
required threshold necessary for a discounted trip.  Second, some consumers may just have a 
strong brand loyalty to a given airline based on past experience.  In any event, since σ  is a 
parameter we estimate, the data will reveal whether or not a sufficient number of passengers are 
brand-loyal to render 0>σ . 
8 
The mean level of utility obtained across the population of consumers that consume 
product j is given by: 
lj
rljljlj
mktCodeshareDCNT
DCNTTapx
 3
21   
_         τ
τττ
ξλ
λλαβδ
+××+
×+++−=
   (1.2) 
where  is a vector of observed product characteristics (the number of intermediate stops used 
by an itinerary, an alternate measure of itinerary convenience, whether or not the origin is a hub 
for the carrier offering the product for sale, and whether or not the product is pure online or 
virtual codeshare), 
ljx  τ
β  is a vector of consumer taste parameters (marginal utilities) associated 
with the product characteristics in ,  is the price of product j, ljx  τ ljp  τ α  is a measure of the 
marginal utility of price,  are airline fixed effects where subscript r indexes ticketing carriers 
(ticketing carrier dummies), T is a zero-one time dummy equal to 1 if the itinerary occurred in 
the post-alliance period, DCN is a zero-one dummy equal to 1 if product j is being offered for 
sale by either Delta, Continental, or Northwest, Codeshare_mkt is a zero-one dummy equal to 1 
if a virtual codeshare product between Delta, Continental, or Northwest was offered in the 
origin-destination market, and 
ra
lj  τξ  captures unobserved (by the econometricians but observed by 
passengers) product characteristics. 
1λ , 2λ , and 3λ  are taste parameters to be estimated.  1λ  captures the change in mean 
utility over the pre- and post-alliance periods for products offered by airlines other than Delta, 
Continental, or Northwest.  21 λλ +  captures the change in mean utility over the pre- and post-
alliance periods for products offered by Delta, Continental, or Northwest in markets where any 
two of the three airlines do not virtual codeshare together.  Therefore, when we focus on markets 
in which Delta, Continental, and Northwest do not virtual codeshare together, 2λ  measures how 
the change in mean utility differs for products offered by Delta, Continental, or Northwest 
compared to products offered by other airlines. 
321 λλλ ++  captures the change in mean utility over the pre- and post-alliance periods 
for products offered by Delta, Continental, or Northwest in markets where any two of the three 
airlines virtual codeshare together.  Therefore, 3λ  measures how the change in mean utility for 
products offered by Delta, Continental, or Northwest differs in markets where any two of the 
three airlines virtual codeshare together compared to markets in which they do not virtual 
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codeshare together.  In other words, 03 >λ  implies that virtual codesharing has a demand-
increasing effect associated with it, which is one of the main hypotheses we want to test. 
The discussion above reveals that a key component of our demand specification that 
allows us to identify demand effects associated with the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare 
alliance ( 3λ ), is that equation (2) effectively compares consumers' choice behavior before and 
after implementation of the alliance in markets where the three airlines virtual codeshare together 
("treatment" markets) versus markets in which they do not virtual codeshare together ("control" 
markets).  A reasonable criticism to raise at this point is that Codeshare_mkt in equation (2) is 
not strictly exogenous since airlines choose which markets to codeshare in and which markets 
not to codeshare in.  However, one argument in support of using Codeshare_mkt as is in equation 
(2), is that airlines' decisions about whether or not to codeshare in a market is likely 
predetermined at the time when a typical consumer decides on their utility maximizing product.  
In other words, it may be reasonable to assume that Codeshare_mkt is a predetermined variable 
in equation (2) and therefore estimates of 3λ  will not be biased. 
We now complete the derivation of our demand equation.  In what follows we drop the 
market and time subscripts (l and τ ) only to avoid a clutter of notation. 
Let there be  products in group g.  If product j is in group g, the well-known formula 
for product j′s predicted group share or equivalently, the conditional probability of choosing 
product j given that group g is chosen is given by 
gG
g
gj D
es
j
)1(
/
σ
δ
−
=  
where, ∑
∈
−=
g
j
Gj
g eD
)1( σ
δ
.  The probability of choosing group g or equivalently, group g′s predicted 
share is 
∑
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+
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g
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11
0
1
σσ
σ
    (1.3) 
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Recall that the outside good is the only good in group 0, therefore, .  As usual, 
we normalize the mean utility of the outside good to zero, i.e. 
01
0
δσ eD =−
00 =δ .  This implies that  
and equation (1.3) can be written as 
110 =−σD
∑
=
−
−
+
= G
g
g
g
g
D
D
s
1
1
1
1 σ
σ
 
The unconditional probability of choosing product j, or equivalently, the predicted market 
share of product j is given by 
∑
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  (1.4) 
Equation (1.4) is the well-known nested logit formula. 
Finally, the demand for product j is given by 
),,,( djj sMd θξpx×=  
where M is a measure of market size, which we assume to be the size of the population in the 
origin city,  is the predicted product share function described in equation (1.4), x and p are 
vectors of observed non-price product characteristics and price, respectively, ξ  is a vector of 
unobserved (by the researchers) product characteristics, and 
)(⋅js
),,,( σλαβθ =d  is the vector of 
demand parameters to be estimated. 
Supply 
What is commonly known about how a codeshare agreement works is that the ticketing 
carrier markets and sets the final price for the round-trip ticket and compensates the operating 
carrier for operating services provided.  Details on compensation mechanisms actually used by 
partner airlines are not usually made known to the public and may even vary across partnerships.  
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Therefore, we face the challenge of coming up with a modeling approach that captures our basic 
understanding of what is commonly known about a codeshare agreement without imposing too 
much structure on a contracting process about which we have few facts.  We concede that the 
following is possibly a simplistic approximation of the actual contracting used by partners to 
compensate each other for services needed to provide a codeshare product. 
One way to proceed, as pointed out in Gayle (2007c), is to think of a codeshare 
agreement as a privately negotiated pricing contract between partners ),( Γw , where w is a per-
passenger price the ticketing carrier pays over to an operating carrier for transporting the 
passenger, while  represents a potential lump sum transfer between partners that determines 
how the joint surplus is distributed.  As we develop the supply side of the model further, it will 
become clear that only the level of w affects equilibrium final product prices.  Since for the 
purposes of this paper we are not concerned how the surplus is distributed between partners 
through the lump sum transfer , we do not attempt to derive an equilibrium value of .
Γ
Γ Γ 5
We assume that the final price of a codeshare product is determined within a sequential 
price-setting game.  In the first stage of the sequential process, the operating carrier sets the price 
for transporting a passenger, w, and privately makes it known to its partner ticketing carrier.  In 
the second stage, conditional on the agreed upon price w for services supplied by the operating 
carrier, the ticketing carrier sets the final round-trip price p for the codeshare product.  The final 
subgame in this sequential price-setting game is played between ticketing carriers. 
Let  index competing ticketing carriers in a market and let f = 1 ,...,F  index 
the corresponding operating carriers.  Further, let  be a subset of the J products that are offered 
for sale by ticketing carrier r in the origin-destination market.
Rr ..., ,1=
rF
6  Carrier r solves the following 
profit maximization problem for each rFj∈ : 
∑
∈
−
r
j Fj
j
f
jjp
qwpMax )(    (1.5) 
where  in equilibrium,  is the quantity of product j offered for sale on the market, 
 is market demand for product j, p represents a 
)(pjj dq = jq
)(pjd 1×J  vector of final prices, and as defined 
                                                 
5 See Chen and Gayle (2007) for a similar theoretical modeling approach of an airline codeshare agreement. 
6 For most of the subsequent equations, we intentionally omit a market subscript for variables and equations only to 
avoid notational clutter.  Notwithstanding our omission of market subscripts, the reader should continue to interpret 
equations in a market-specific way. 
12 
previously  is the price the ticketing carrier pays to operating carrier f for its transportation 
services.  So  is the effective marginal cost that ticketing carrier r incurs by offering 
codeshare product j for sale.
f
jw
f
jw
7  Since in the first stage of the sequential price-setting game 
operating carriers each optimally choose , we know that the equilibrium level of  depends 
on the marginal cost of the operating carrier that offers transportation services for codeshare 
product j.  Therefore, we can specify  as a function of factors that shift the marginal cost of 
the operating carrier.  Specifically, we posit that 
f
jw
f
jw
f
jw
)exp( jfj
f
j aWw ηγ ++=  
where  is a vector of variables that shift marginal cost of the operating carrier (itinerary 
distance, itinerary distance squared, time fixed effect) and 
jW
γ  is the associated vector of 
parameters,  captures the operating carrier-specific portion of marginal cost, and fa jη  is a 
mean-zero, random error term that captures unobserved determinants of marginal cost. 
In the event that product j is a pure online product instead of a virtual codeshare product, 
we replace  in profit function (1.5) with , where  is the marginal cost that carrier r incurs 
by offering product j.  Note that in such a case carrier r is the sole ticketing and operating carrier 
of product j.  The marginal cost function is therefore 
f
jw
r
jc
r
jc
⎩⎨
⎧=++
online pure is  if              
codeshare  virtualis  if    
)exp(
jc
jw
aW r
j
f
j
jfj ηγ    (1.6) 
Competitive Interactions 
In the spirit of Sudhir (2001), we measure cooperative or aggressive behavior by the 
degree to which equilibrium prices may deviate from Bertrand-Nash prices.  We now augment 
the profit function (1.5) above to allow for such analysis. 
Let  be a subset of the J products that are offered for sale by the alliance partners of 
carrier r, while  is a subset of the J products that are offered for sale by carriers that are not 
partners of carrier r.  Note that sets , , and  do not have any elements in common but 
rA
rB
rF rA rB
                                                 
7 We implicitly assume here that the ticketing carrier of a virtual codeshare product only incurs fixed expenses in 
marketing the product to potential passengers. 
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together they contain all the products in the market.  We can now specify the augmented profit 
function for carrier r: 
∑∑∑
∈∈
−
∈
−×+−×+−=Π
rrr Bj
j
f
jj
Aj
aj
f
jj
Fj
aj
f
jjr qwpqwpqwp )()()( φφ   (1.7) 
where aφ  is the weight an airline puts on its partners' profits, while a−φ  is the weight an airline 
puts on non-partners' profits.  Note that 0=φ  in the augmented profit function (1.7) yields the 
profit function in (1.5), which would generate Bertrand Nash prices. Therefore, 0>φ  implies 
cooperative behavior relative to Bertrand Nash, while 0<φ  implies more aggressive competitive 
behavior relative to Bertrand Nash. 
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium in final prices requires that  of any product j offered 
by carrier r must satisfy the first-order condition: 
jp
0)()()()()()()( =∂
∂−×+∂
∂−×+∂
∂−+=∂
Π∂ ∑∑∑
∈
−
∈∈ rrr Bk j
kf
kja
Ak j
kf
kja
Fk j
kf
kjj
j
r
p
dwp
p
dwp
p
dwpd
p
pppp φφ  
The first-order conditions are a set of J equations, one for each product.  A few additional 
definitions allow for a more convenient representation of the first-order conditions using matrix 
notation. 
First, let  be a ownΩ JJ ×  matrix which describes the ticketing carriers' ownership 
structure of the J products.  Let  denote an element in ),( jkownΩ ownΩ , where 
⎩⎨
⎧=Ω
otherwise0 
carrier same by the offered are  and  productsdistinct  if1 
),(
jk
jkown  
Second, let  be a aΩ JJ ×  matrix which contains zeros and aφ , which is the parameter 
describing the degree of competition between partner carriers.  Let ),( jkaΩ  denote an element 
in , where aΩ
⎩⎨
⎧=Ω
otherwise0 
carrierspartner by  offered are  and  productsdistinct  if 
),( a
jk
jka
φ
 
Third, let  be a a−Ω JJ ×  matrix which contains zeros and a−φ , which is the parameter 
describing the degree of competition between carriers that do not belong to the same alliance.  
Let  denote an element in ),( jka−Ω a−Ω , where 
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⎧
=Ω−
otherwise0 
alliance same  the tobelongnot  do   that           
carriersby  offered are  and  productsdistinct  if
 
),(
a-
jk
jka
φ
 
Fourth, let Δ  be a JJ ×  matrix of first-order derivatives of product market shares with 
respect to final prices, where element 
k
j
p
d
jk ∂
∂−=Δ ),( .  In vector notation, the system of J first-
order conditions for the ticketing carriers can now conveniently be expressed as 
)(]*).[( 1 pdwp ×ΔΩ+Ω+Ω+= −−aaown    (1.8) 
where , p, and w are  vectors of product demands, final prices, and ticketing carriers' 
effective marginal costs, respectively, while .* means element-by-element multiplication of two 
matrices.  Equation (1.8) says the set of prices p that satisfy a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a 
function of effective marginal costs, w, and product markups, . 
)(⋅d 1×J
)(]*).[( 1 pd×ΔΩ+Ω+Ω −−aaown
Specializing the Supply Equation 
We now specialize equation (1.8) to facilitate analyzing the competitive effects of virtual 
codesharing between Delta, Continental, and Northwest in markets where at least two of them 
are direct competitors both before and subsequent to forming the alliance.  Appendix A provides 
a simple three-airline single market example of the supply model laid out below. 
As we discuss further in the data section, our sample is restricted to markets in which at 
least two of the three airlines (Delta, Continental, and Northwest) offer their own competing pure 
online products.  Furthermore, the time span of the sample is deliberately chosen to include pre-
alliance and post-alliance periods. 
Let  be the weight Delta, Continental, and Northwest put on each others' profits in the 
pre-alliance period, while  is the weight competing airlines put on each others' profits 
assuming that at least one airline in the pair of competitors is neither Delta, Continental, or 
Northwest.  For example, Delta's profit function in a market during the pre-alliance period is: 
pre
dcnφ
pre
dcn−φ
∑∑∑
∈∈
−
∈
−+−×+−=Π
DeltaDeltaDelta Bj
j
f
jj
Aj
pre
dcnj
f
jj
Fj
pre
dcnj
f
jjDelta qwpqwpqwp )()()( φφ   (1.9) 
where  is the set of products offered for sale by Delta airlines in the specific origin-
destination market during the pre-alliance period,  is the set of products offered either by 
DeltaF
DeltaA
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Northwest or Continental airlines in the said market during the pre-alliance period, and  is 
the set of products offered by other competing airlines in the said market during the pre-alliance 
period. 
DeltaB
Based on our matrix notation convention described above, this market would have the 
following matrices associated with it during the pre-alliance period: ownpre−Ω , , and 
, where   is a 
comppre
dcn
−Ω
comppre
dcn
−
−Ω ownpre−Ω JJ ×  matrix of zeros and ones that describes the ticketing 
carriers' ownership structure of the J products in the pre-alliance period,  is a matrix of 
zeros and , while  is a matrix of zeros and .  The system of product markup 
equations during the pre-alliance period for a market is: 
comppre
dcn
−Ω
pre
dcnφ comppredcn−−Ω predcn−φ
( )[ ] preprecomppredcncomppredcnownprepre )(*. 1 pdm ×ΔΩ+Ω+Ω= −−−−−  
During the post-alliance period, Delta, Continental, and Northwest only virtual codeshare 
together in a subset of the markets in our sample.  So in our sample some markets play the role 
of a treatment group ( 1=ν , markets in which the three airlines directly compete and virtual 
codeshare together), while the other markets play the role of a control group ( 0=ν , markets in 
which the three airlines directly compete but do not virtual codeshare together). 
In markets where Delta, Continental, and Northwest do codeshare together in the post-
alliance period, let  be the weight that each of the three airlines put on each others’ profit, 
while  is the weight competing airlines put on each others’ profits assuming that at least 
one airline in the pair of competitors is neither Delta, Continental, or Northwest.  In the case of 
markets in which Delta, Continental, and Northwest do not codeshare together in the post-
alliance period, let  be the weight that each of the three airlines put on each others profit, 
while  is the weight competing airlines put on each others profits assuming that at least 
one airline in the pair of competitors is neither Delta, Continental, or Northwest.  For a given 
market in the post-alliance period, the markup equation is: 
post
dcn 1  , =νφ
post
dcn 1  , =− νφ
post
dcn 0  , =νφ
post
dcn 0  , =− νφ
( )[ ]{ }
( )[ ]{ } postpostcomppostdcncomppostdcnownpost
postpostcomppost
dcn
comppost
dcn
ownpostpost
V
V
)(*. *).(         
)(*. *. 
1 
0  ,0  ,
1 
1  ,1  ,
pd
pdm
×ΔΩ+Ω+Ω−Υ+
×ΔΩ+Ω+Ω=
−−
=−
−
=
−
−−
=−
−
=
−
νν
νν , 
where V is a JJ ×  indicator matrix whose elements are all ones if 1=ν  for this market, but if 
0=ν  for the market, then all elements in V are zeros.  Υ is a JJ ×  matrix of ones.  To complete 
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our description of , note that  is a postm comppostdcn
−
=Ω 1  , ν JJ ×  matrix that contains zeros and , 
 is a 
post
dcn 1  , =νφ
comppost
dcn
−
=−Ω 1  , ν JJ ×  matrix that contains zeros and ,  is a postdcn 1  , =− νφ comppostdcn − =Ω 0  , ν JJ ×  matrix that 
contains zeros and , and  is a postdcn 0  , =νφ comppostdcn− =−Ω 0  , ν JJ ×  matrix that contains zeros and .  
See Appendix A for an illustration of what the matrices in  and  look like in the case 
of a three-airline single market example. 
post
dcn 0  , =− νφ
prem postm
The supply equation used to evaluate the competitive effects of virtual codesharing 
between Delta, Continental, and Northwest is given by: 
lll ,,, τττ mwp +=     (1.10) 
where τ  indexes time period, l indexes market, and  is the product markup term for market l 
during period 
l,τm
τ .  From above we know that  is determined by the expression for either  
or . 
l,τm
prem
postm
Our task is to use equation (1.10) along with our demand equation to obtain econometric 
estimates of , , , ,  and .  We can then do pairwise 
comparisons of these parameters.  For example, if , then the degree of 
competitiveness between Delta, Continental, and Northwest differs in markets where they 
directly compete and virtual codeshare together compared to markets in which they directly 
compete but do not virtual codeshare together.  Second, if , then the degree of 
competitiveness between Delta, Continental, and Northwest differs in the post-alliance period 
relative to the pre-alliance period.  Most important, the pairwise comparisons of , , 
and  can help us determine whether pairwise comparisons of , , and  
are identifying the competitive effects of virtual codesharing between Delta, Continental, and 
Northwest or just reflecting market wide trends in competitive behavior. 
pre
dcnφ predcn−φ postdcn 1  , =νφ postdcn 1  , =− νφ postdcn 0  , =νφ postdcn 0  , =− νφ
post
dcn
post
dcn 0  ,1  , == ≠ νν φφ
pre
dcn
post
dcn φφ ν ≠=1  ,
pre
dcn−φ postdcn 1  , =− νφ
post
dcn 0  , =− νφ predcnφ postdcn 1  , =νφ postdcn 0  , =νφ
Implicit in our discussion above is that a key component of our strategy to identify (anti-) 
competitive effects associated with the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance is to 
compare Delta, Continental, Northwest, and other airlines' pricing behavior before and after 
implementation of the alliance in markets where the three carriers virtual codeshare together 
("treatment" markets) versus markets in which they compete but do not virtual codeshare 
together ("control" markets).  Again, we acknowledge that the airlines also choose which 
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markets to codeshare in, but we presume that such codeshare choices would have been decided 
prior to making optimal pricing decisions for the menu of products the airlines already planned 
to offer passengers.  Our analysis is therefore focused on short-run pricing behavior conditional 
on the airlines' predetermined menu of product offerings. 
In summary, the vector of supply parameters are, ),( φγθ =s . 
1.4.  Estimation 
The parameters to be estimated are ),,,( σλαβθ =d  for demand and ),( φγθ =s  for 
supply.  Following Berry (1994), the estimation strategy for demand parameters involves 
choosing parameter values such that observed product shares, , are equal to predicted product 
shares, , that is, 
jS
js
jsS jj     ),,( ∀= σδ     (1.11) 
We compute observed product shares based on 
M
q
S jj = , where M is the size of the 
population in the origin city and  is the actual number of travel tickets sold for a particular 
itinerary-airline(s) combination called product j.  As Berry (1994) shows, in the case of the 
nested logit model, we can analytically solve for the mean levels of utility (
jq
δ ) that satisfy 
equation (1.11). The analytical solution is: 
)ln()ln()ln( /0 gjjj SSS σδ −−=     (1.12) 
where  is the observed share of the outside option, and  is the observed within group share 
of product j.
0S gjS /
8  Using equation (1.2) to substitute for jδ  in equation (1.12) and rearranging terms 
yields: 
j
rgjjjj
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3
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8 The observed share of the outside option is computed by , where .  The observed 
within group share of product j is computed by 
∑
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where jξ  is the structural demand error term. 
Provided we have valid instruments for  and , equation (1.13) is straightforward 
to estimate using a linear instrumental variables technique such as two-stage least squares 
(2SLS).  However, we are also interested in estimating supply parameters, and there is some 
efficiency benefit in estimating demand and supply parameters jointly.  Since both demand and 
supply parameters enter the supply equation in a nonlinear way, we need a nonlinear system 
estimation technique to estimate the parameters jointly.  We use system Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) for joint estimation of the parameters. 
jp gjS /
Using the marginal cost function in equation (1.6) to substitute for w in equation (1.10) 
yields the following econometric specification of the supply equation: 
),()exp( φθηγ djjfjj maWp +++=  
or equivalently, 
[ ] jfjdjj aWmp ηγφθ ++=− ),(ln     (1.14) 
where jη  is the structural supply error term, and ),( φθdjm  is the product markup function that 
depends on demand and competition parameters, dθ  and φ . 
The GMM estimates of the parameters are obtained by solving the following problem, 
ψψθθ ZZMinsd ′Φ′
−1
,
    
where ψ  is a vector of the demand and supply structural error terms, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
j
j
η
ξψ ,  is a 
positive definite weight matrix, while Z is a block diagonal matrix of instruments for the demand 
and supply equations that are assumed orthogonal to the error vector 
1−Φ
ψ .9
Instruments 
First focusing on demand equation (1.13), we recognize that a product's price and its 
within group share (  and  respectively) are likely to be correlated with the portion of the jp gjS /
                                                 
9 In particular,  where  is an ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
s
d
Z
Z
Z
0
0
dZ dLN ×  matrix of demand instruments and  is an  matrix 
of supply instruments. N is the sample size,  is the number of demand instruments, while  is the number of 
supply instruments. 
sZ sLN ×
dL sL
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product's quality captured in jξ  (where jξ  is unobserved to the researchers but observed to 
passengers).  As such, we need to find instruments for  and .  We make the well-known 
identifying assumption found in the literature on discrete choice models of demand that observed 
non-price product characteristics are uncorrelated with the unobserved product quality, 
jp gjS /
jξ .  This 
allows us to use various combinations of non-price product characteristics to form valid 
instruments for  and . jp gjS /
The instruments we use for the demand equation include:  (1) itinerary distance; (2) the 
squared deviation of a product's itinerary distance from the average itinerary distance of 
competing products offered by other airlines; (3) the number of competing products offered by 
other airlines with equivalent number of intermediate stops; (4) the number of competitor 
products in the market; (5) the number of other products offered by an airline in a market; and 
(6) the mean number of intermediate stops across products offered by an airline in a market.10  
As described in Gayle (2007a and 2007c), instruments (1) to (5) are motivated by supply theory, 
which predicts that the equilibrium price and within group product share are affected by changes 
in marginal cost and changes in product markup.  For example, itinerary distance (instrument 
(1)) is a marginal cost shifting variable, instruments (2) to (4) proxy for the degree of 
competition facing a product, which in turn affects the size of a product's markup, and instrument 
(5) recognizes the fact that the more substitute products an airline offers in a market, ceteris 
paribus, the airline is better able to charge a higher markup on each of these products.  Last, 
instrument (6) is possibly associated with reasons why passengers may prefer the set of products 
offered by one airline over the set of products offered by other airlines. 
As mentioned above, the structural error term in supply equation (1.14), jη , captures the 
unobserved portion of marginal cost, which is correlated with price.  Due to the nonlinearity of 
the predicted product share function with respect to price, the product markup term, , is a 
function of price.  Therefore,  is likely to be correlated with 
jm
jm jη  in the supply equation.  We 
assume that observed non-price product characteristics are uncorrelated with jη .  Based on the 
                                                 
10 We also include interactions of these variables as instruments. 
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discussion of the validity of instruments used in the demand equation, instruments (2) to (6) 
above are also valid for the supply equation. 
1.5.  Data 
Data are drawn from the Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is a 10% random 
sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers.  DB1B is a database that is maintained and 
published by the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics.  Among other things the database 
includes: (1) number of passengers that choose a given flight itinerary; (2) the fares of these 
itineraries; (3) the specific sequence of airport stops that each itinerary uses in getting passengers 
from the origin to destination city; (4) the carrier(s) that marketed and sold the travel ticket 
(ticketing carriers), and the carrier(s) that passengers actually fly on for their trip (operating 
carriers); and (5) the distance flown on each itinerary in a directional market.  The distance 
associated with each itinerary in a market may differ since each itinerary may use different 
connecting airports in transporting passengers from the origin to destination city.  The data we 
use link each product to a directional market rather than a mere non-stop route or segment of a 
market.  For this research, we focus on U.S. domestic flights offered and operated by U.S. 
carriers in the fourth quarters of 2002 (pre-alliance) and 2003 (post-alliance).11
We arrive at the final sample used for estimation by applying a few filters to the original 
data set.  First, itineraries with price less than $100 are excluded due to the high probability that 
these may be coding errors or passengers redeeming frequent flyer miles to obtain a discounted 
fare.  Second, itineraries with an inordinate number (more than three) of intermediate stops were 
dropped.  Third, we focus on pure online and virtual codeshare products as defined previously.  
Fourth, following the standard practice for empirical analyses of airline codesharing, we recode 
regional feeder carriers to have their major carrier codes.  In the absence of such recoding of 
feeder carriers, products that only include a major carrier and its associated regional feeder 
carrier(s) may mistakenly be counted as codeshare products since the operating and ticketing 
carrier codes would differ.12  Fifth, based on our previously stated research objectives, we focus 
on origin-destination markets in which at least two of the three airlines (Delta, Continental, and 
Northwest) offered competing pure online products both in the pre and post-alliance periods.  In 
                                                 
11 Collecting data from the same quarter in both years will eliminate potential seasonal effects in demand. 
12 We identify codeshare products as products where the ticketing and operating carriers differ. 
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other words, the three carriers' networks overlap in all of the markets that remained in our final 
sample. 
After applying the above restrictions, we follow Gayle (2007a) and collapse the data by 
averaging the price and aggregating the number of passengers purchasing products as defined by 
unique itinerary-airline(s) combination.  In other words, before the data are collapsed, there are 
several observations of a given itinerary-airline(s) combination that are distinguished by prices 
paid and number of passengers paying each of those prices.13  The final sample has 124,965 
products contained in 4,300 origin-destination markets that span the pre and post-alliance 
periods. 
Variables that we gathered and constructed from the database that have not yet been 
described are "Price", "Hub", "Stops", "Convenient", and "Virtual".  These variables are the 
observable product characteristics contained in vector  in equation (1.2).  "Price" is the 
average price paid by passengers who chose the specific itinerary-airline(s) combination.  "Hub" 
is a zero-one dummy variable that takes the value one if the origin airport is a hub for the 
ticketing carrier.  "Stops" is a variable that counts the number of intermediate stops associated 
with each product.  For example, in the case of products that use non-stop flight itineraries, 
"Stops" takes the value zero.  "Convenient" is the ratio of itinerary distance to the non-stop 
distance between origin and destination airports.  The presumption is that an itinerary is less 
convenient the further its "Convenient" measure is from 1.  "Virtual" is a zero-one dummy that 
takes the value one if the product is virtual codeshared.  We leave discussing the rationale for 
using each of these variables until the results section since the main task now is to provide 
descriptive information on the data. 
ljx  τ
Table 1.1 provides a list of the airlines in the sample according to type of products the 
airlines are involved in.  Table 1.2 reports sample summary statistics broken down by time 
period and market type, where market type is based on whether or not Delta, Continental, and 
Northwest virtual codeshare together in the market. 
                                                 
13 Based on how products are defined in this paper, which follows product definition in Gayle (2007a), the demand 
model is only intended to explain choices between itinerary-airline(s) combinations rather than more narrowly 
defined products that may differ within a given itinerary-airline(s) combination. 
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Table 1.1 List of Airlines in the Dataset 
Airlines Involved in Virtual 
Codeshare Products 
Airlines Involved in Pure Online  
Products 
Airline Name Code Airline Name Code 
American Airlines Inc. AA American Airlines Inc. AA 
Alaska Airlines Inc. AS Alaska Airlines Inc. AS 
Continental Air Lines Inc. CO JetBlue Airways B6 
Delta Air Lines Inc.  DL Continental Air Lines Inc. CO 
Hawaiian Airlines HA Delta Air Lines Inc.  DL 
America West Airlines HP Frontier Airlines F9 
Northwest Airlines Inc.  NW AirTran Airways FL 
United Air Lines Inc. UA America West Airlines HP 
US Airways Inc. US National Airlines N7 
  Spirit Air Lines NK 
  Northwest Airlines Inc.  NW 
  Chautauqua Airlines RP 
  Expressjet Airlines RU 
  Sun Country Airlines SY 
  ATA Airlines TZ 
  United Air Lines Inc. UA 
  US Airways Inc. US 
  Mesaba Airlines XJ 
  Midwest Airlines YX 
 
Notes:  Note that feeder carriers such as Chautauqua Airlines and Expressjet Airlines are not  
listed as involved in codeshare products.  This is because we assign these carriers their major  
carrier codes (effectively not making a distinction between feeder and major carriers) for products 
where feeder carriers operate segment(s) of the trip but the ticketing carrier is the major carrier.  
However, the feeder carriers do offer pure online products, which is why they show up in the 
column labeled “Airlines involved in Pure Online Products”.  In the data section of the text we 
provide discussion on the rationale for assigning feeder carriers their major carrier code prior to 
identifying codeshare products. 
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Table 1.2 Summary statistics broken down by time period and market type, where market 
type is based on whether or not DL, CO, and NW virtual codeshare together in the market 
 
Origin-destination markets in which DL, CO and NW virtual codeshare together 
during the post-alliance period (2262 markets). 
 Pre-alliance period (2002) Post-alliance period (2003) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Price 251.84 184.72 100.06 4227.03 241.03 162.81 100 4227.03
HUB 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1
Stops 1.23 0.70 0 3 1.15 0.64 0 3
Convenient 1.25 0.30 1 3.66 1.24 0.29 1 3.64
Virtual 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1
 Number of products = 38171 Number of products = 41219 
 
Origin-destination markets in which DL, CO and NW did not virtual codeshare 
together during the post-alliance period (2038 markets). 
 Pre-alliance period (2002) Post-alliance period (2003) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Price 263.51 202.88 100 5810.01 251.85 171.03 100.02 3274.82
HUB 0.19 0.39 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1
Stops 1.22 0.70 0 3 1.14 0.66 0 3
Convenient 1.30 0.35 1 3.53 1.27 0.34 1 3.49
Virtual 0.02 0.14 0 1 0.07 0.26 0 1
 Number of products = 22512 Number of products = 23063 
 
 
First, Table 1.2 reveals that during the post-alliance period the three airlines virtual 
codeshare together in 2,262 of the origin-destination markets in our sample, while they did not 
virtual codeshare together in 2,038 of the origin-destination markets.  In all these 4,300 origin-
destination markets, at least two of the three airlines offered their own substitute pure online 
products both in the pre and post-alliance periods.  Second, markets in which the three airlines 
virtual codeshare together tend to have more competing products compared to markets in which 
the three airlines do not virtual codeshare together.  Third, the mean level of each product 
characteristic does not seem to have drastic changes between pre and post-alliance periods.  
However, it is noticeable that mean prices are slightly higher in markets where the three airlines 
do not virtual codeshare together compared to markets in which they do virtual codeshare 
together.  Furthermore, there is a slight decline in mean price over the pre- and post-alliance 
periods. 
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Table 1.3 provides similar statistics as in Table 1.2 with the exception that Table 1.3 
focuses on products offered by Delta, Continental, or Northwest.  The market trends we 
identified in Table 1.2 appear to follow through to Table 1.3.  For example, the three airlines' 
mean prices seem to be lower and they offer more substitute products in markets that they virtual 
codeshare together compared to markets that they do not virtual codeshare together.  In 
summary, the trends of simple descriptive statistics across Tables 1.2 and 1.3 suggest that 
competition may be stiffer in markets where the three airlines virtual codeshare together 
compared to markets in which they do not virtual codeshare together.  But these descriptive 
statistics do not disentangle the effects of consumer behavior from the effects of strategic 
interactions between competing airlines, which is why we now turn to analyzing results from our 
formal econometric model. 
Table 1.3 Summary statistics for products offered by DL, CO or NW.  These statistics are 
broken down by time period and market type, where market type is based on whether or 
not DL, CO, and NW virtual codeshare together in the market. 
 
Origin-destination markets in which DL, CO and NW virtual codeshare together 
during the post-alliance period (2262 markets). 
 Pre-alliance period (2002) Post-alliance period (2003) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Price 244.46 176.08 100.06 2330.08 237.02 154.70 100.01 3287.9
HUB 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.13 0.33 0 1
Stops 1.23 0.67 0 3 1.15 0.62 0 3
Convenient 1.26 0.30 1 3.13 1.25 0.29 1 3.05
Virtual 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1
 Number of products = 19675 Number of products = 20492 
 
Origin-destination markets in which DL, CO and NW did not virtual codeshare 
together during the post-alliance period (2038 markets). 
 Pre-alliance period (2002) Post-alliance period (2003) 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Price 256.84 190.23 100 3611.51 248.46 155.62 100.17 2449.14
HUB 0.11 0.31 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
Stops 1.22 0.67 0 3 1.14 0.64 0 3
Convenient 1.31 0.35 1 3.53 1.30 0.34 1 3.49
Virtual 0.04 0.19 0 1 0.001 0.03 0 1
 Number of products = 11517 Number of products = 10896 
 
 
1.6.  Results 
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We begin by estimating demand equation (1.13) by itself using straightforward linear 
estimation techniques such as ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS).  
Results from the single equation demand estimation are reported in Table 1.4. 
Table 1.4 Demand Parameter Estimates from Single Equation Estimation 
 
Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) 
Two-Stage Least Squares 
(2SLS) 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error 
Constant -11.657* 0.135 -10.952* 0.146
Price -0.012* 0.003 -0.251* 0.016
Stops -1.013* 0.015 -1.031* 0.020
Convenient -0.458* 0.009 -0.722* 0.011
Hub 1.028* 0.023 0.805* 0.026
Hub × Stops -0.426* 0.016 -0.612* 0.017
Virtual -0.940* 0.016 -1.127* 0.019
σ  0.441* 0.002 0.175* 0.006
T     1λ  = -0.033* 0.012   1λ  = -0.048* 0.013
T × DCN   2λ  = -0.319* 0.021   2λ  = -0.241* 0.023
T × DCN × Codeshare_mkt   3λ  =  0.439* 0.018   3λ  = 0.315* 0.020
R2 0.4655 0.3835 
Exogeniety Test: 
Hausman statistic = 3227.91 
Critical ( ) =2 ,95.02χ 5.99 
 
 
 
Notes:  Models are estimated with ticketing carrier dummies even though these dummy coefficients are 
not reported in the table.  * indicates statistical significance at the 1%  level. 
 
 
The first two data columns in Table 1.4 report OLS estimates.  The OLS estimation 
ignore that price and within group product share (  and  respectively) are likely 
endogenous variables, and therefore the estimates of the price coefficient and 
jp gjS /
σ  are most likely 
biased.  To confirm the endogeneity of price and within group product share we re-estimate the 
demand equation using 2SLS and perform a Hausman exogeneity test.  Based on the Hausman 
test we easily reject at conventional levels of statistical significance that price and within group 
product share are exogenous variables in the demand equation.  As such, the following 
discussion of results in Table 1.4 is based on the 2SLS estimates. 
All coefficient estimates are statistically different from zero at conventional levels of 
significance.  So the following discussion focuses on the signs of the estimated coefficients.  
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First, as expected, an air travel product's price has a negative effect on the utility obtained from 
choosing the product, ceteris paribus.  Second, the more intermediate stops an air travel product 
has, the lower the utility obtained from choosing that product, ceteris paribus.  The number of 
intermediate stops that an air travel product has is one measure of the inherent convenience of 
the travel itinerary - the negative coefficient for "Stops" is consistent with our expectation.14
Gayle (2007a) points out that number of intermediate stops may only capture a portion of 
the inherent convenience of an itinerary.  For example, two itineraries may each have one 
intermediate stop, but depending on where the intermediate stop is located in relation to the 
origin and destination cities, the two one-stop itineraries may have very different travel distances 
and travel time associated with them.  As such, passengers could view these two itineraries as 
having very different levels of convenience even though the itineraries have the same number of 
intermediate stops.  Our "Convenient" variable, which measures the ratio of itinerary distance to 
non-stop distance between the origin and destination cities, is supposed to capture aspects of 
itinerary convenience that are not picked up by number of intermediate stops.15  We therefore 
expect the coefficient on "Convenient" to be negative, which is indeed the estimated sign in 
Table 1.4. 
It has been argued that passengers are more likely to choose itineraries offered by hub 
airlines for the following reasons: (1) flight schedules offered by hub airlines may be more 
convenient; (2) it is more likely that passengers have frequent-flyer membership with a hub 
airline.16  We also include the interaction variable "Hub × Stops", to capture the possibility that 
an advantage of hub products17 over non-hub products may not be absolute.  In other words, if a 
hub product happens to have sufficiently unattractive features (such as large number of 
intermediate stops) relative to a non-hub product, then consumers are likely to choose the non-
hub product over the hub product.  Consistent with these arguments, the coefficient on "Hub" is 
positive while the coefficient on "Hub × Stops" is negative.  The negative coefficient on "Hub × 
                                                 
14 The coefficient on "Hub × Stops" is also negative which implies that intermediate stops are viewed negatively by 
consumers whether or not the product is a hub product.  This interaction variable is discussed further in a subsequent 
paragraph. 
15 The minimum value that the "Convenient" variable can take on is 1.  As such, the further an itinerary's 
"Convenient" measure is from 1, the less convenient is the itinerary. 
16 See Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1995), Berry (1990), Schumann (1986). 
17 As described earlier, a hub product means that the origin airport on the itinerary is a hub for the airline that offers 
the product for sale. 
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Stops" also suggests that intermediate stops are viewed more negatively for hub products 
compared to non-hub products.18
Ito and Lee (2007) argue that passengers that are members of an airline's frequent-flyer 
program may view the airline's virtual codeshare product as an inferior substitute to its pure 
online product since virtual tickets often do not allow the frequent-flyer to upgrade to first class 
even though the flights on the two itineraries (pure online and virtual) are the same.  This 
argument leads us to expect the negative sign of the coefficient on the "Virtual" dummy variable 
in Table 1.4.  In other words, the negative sign suggests that passengers perceive virtual 
codeshare products as inferior substitutes to pure online products. 
The estimate of σ is statistically greater than zero, but its value is closer to zero than one.  
As such, there is statistical (but weak economic) evidence that passengers perceive the set of 
products offered by an airline as closer substitutes for each other compared to the substitutability 
of these products with products offered by other airlines [Gayle (2007b)].  In other words, 
passengers' choice behavior does have some element of airline brand-loyalty associated with it, 
even though this brand-loyalty does not seem to be very strong. 
The results in Table 1.4 indicate that 01 <λ , 02 <λ , and 03 >λ .  First, 01 <λ  implies 
that the mean level of utility declines over the pre and post-alliance periods for products offered 
by airlines other than Delta, Continental, or Northwest.  Second, 02 <λ  implies that the mean 
utility for products offered by Delta, Continental, or Northwest in markets where the three 
airlines do not virtual codeshare together falls by more compared to the fall in mean utility for 
products offered by other airlines in the said markets.  Third, 03 >λ  suggests that virtual 
codesharing between Delta, Continental, and Northwest has a demand-increasing effect 
associated with it, which is the main demand effect of virtual codesharing we set out to test. 
We also tested the null hypothesis that 0321 =++ λλλ , and could not reject this null 
hypothesis at conventional levels of statistical significance.  In other words, the statistical 
evidence suggests that the mean utility is unchanged over the pre and post-alliance periods for 
products offered by Delta, Continental, and Northwest in markets where the three airlines virtual 
codeshare together.  However, note that this is in contrast to the decrease in mean utility 
( 021 <+ λλ ) for Delta, Continental, and Northwest's products in markets where the three 
                                                 
18 See Gayle (2007a) for some intuition on this result. 
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airlines do not virtual codeshare together.  In summary, the apparent demand-increasing effect of 
virtual codesharing serves to halt the decline in mean utility obtained from products offered by 
Delta, Continental, and Northwest. 
Results from the System GMM Estimation 
We now discuss results from joint estimation of parameters in the demand and supply 
equations, which are reported in Table 1.5.  Given the nonlinearity in how both demand and 
supply parameters enter the supply equation, the system GMM estimation algorithm was 
overwhelmed by the large number of matrices (which is determined by the large number of 
markets in the sample)19 that have to be computed with each iteration in searching for the set of 
parameters that minimizes the GMM objective function.20  So we proceeded by using a random 
number generator to randomly select a manageable subsample of markets from the full data set 
on which we ran the system GMM estimation algorithm.  The random subsample has a total of 
495 origin-destination markets (approximately 12% of full sample origin-destination markets) 
and 14,431 products that span the pre and post-alliance periods.21  Delta, Continental, and 
Northwest virtual codeshare together in 256 (or 51.7%) of the 495 subsample origin-destination 
markets during the post-alliance period.  In the full sample the three airlines virtual codeshare 
together in 52.6 % of the origin-destination markets during the post-alliance period.  This is an 
encouraging sign that our randomly drawn subsample is representative of the full sample.  
Furthermore, the qualitative demand results are consistent across Tables 1.4 and 1.5, which gives 
us additional reassurance that our random subsample used for Table 1.5 is fairly representative of 
market conditions in the full sample.  As such, we go straight to discussing the supply results in 
Table 1.5. 
                                                 
19 Please revisit the supply side of the econometric model outlined previously to see the structure of the matrices that 
must be computed for each market. 
20 When we ran the GMM estimation algorithm on the full sample using a very powerful computer (Intel Core2 
quad, 8GB random access memory, 64 bit operating system), the computer code ran continuously for over two and a 
half months (more than 80 days) without convergence. The significant number of markets in the full sample caused 
a single iteration in the GMM algorithm to take more than one minute. 
21 Recall that in the data section we report that the full sample has 124,965 products contained in 4,300 origin-
destination markets. 
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Table 1.5 Demand and Supply Parameter Estimates 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Standard 
Error 
Demand Equation:  
Constant -10.318* 0.003 
Price -1.000* 0.001 
Stops -0.612* 0.001 
Convenient -0.544* 0.000 
Hub 0.915* 0.005 
Hub × Stops -0.753* 0.001 
Virtual -1.627* 0.001 
σ  0.001* 0.0002 
T    1λ = -0.039* 0.0005 
T × DCN    2λ = -0.086* 0.001 
T × DCN × Codeshare_mkt    3λ = 0.083* 0.001 
Supply Equation:   
Marginal Cost Shifters  
Constant -0.520 0.419 
Distance 0.280 0.263 
Distance2 -0.000004 0.0003 
T 0.006* 0.001 
Competitive Interaction Parameters  
pre
dcnφ  0.453 0.776 
pre
dcn−φ  0.032 0.359 
post
vdcn 0, =φ  14.630 24.208 
post
vdcn 0, =−φ  2.981 2.148 
post
vdcn 1, =φ  -0.101* 0.002 
post
vdcn 1, =−φ  -0.410† 0.163 
GMM objective = 3574.25  
Notes:  The demand equation includes a set of ticketing carrier dummies while the 
supply equation includes a set of operating carrier dummies even though the 
estimated dummy coefficients are not reported in the table.  * and † indicate 
statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
First, consistent with previous empirical findings [see Berry, Carnal, and Spiller (1997) 
and Gayle (2007a)], the sign pattern of the coefficients on distance and distance squared suggests 
that marginal cost increases with itinerary distance up to some distance threshold and declines in 
distance thereafter.  However, the distance coefficients are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels of significance. 
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Second, recall that T is a zero-one time dummy that equals one for the post-alliance 
period.  The positive coefficient associated with T in the marginal cost function suggests that 
marginal cost increased over the time period of our sample.  This result is not surprising given 
increases in fuel cost over the period. 
Our most important result from the supply equation lies in the estimated competitive 
interaction parameters.  The competitive interaction parameters for the pre-alliance period (  
and ) and for the markets in which Delta, Continental, and Northwest compete but do not 
virtual codeshare together in the post-alliance period (  and ), are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of significance.  In other words, the degree of 
market competitiveness characterized by differentiated products Bertrand Nash equilibrium 
( 0
pre
dcnφ
pre
dcn−φ
post
dcn 0  , =νφ postdcn 0  , =− νφ
=φ ) cannot be rejected in these markets.  However,  and  are both statistically 
less than zero at conventional levels of significance, which implies that competition is more 
aggressive than Bertrand Nash in markets where Delta, Continental, and Northwest compete and 
virtual codeshare together in the post-alliance period. 
post
dcn 1  , =νφ postdcn 1  , =− νφ
Even though we find that competition is more aggressive in markets where the three 
airlines compete and virtual codeshare together, it is interesting to know whether such 
heightened competition is uniform across all airlines in these markets.  In other words, is there a 
difference in the level of competition between Delta, Continental, and Northwest versus the level 
of competition between the other airlines in these markets?  To get at this question we formally 
test whether  is statistically equal to  and find that we reject this equality in favor 
of  at conventional levels of significance.
post
dcn 1  , =νφ postdcn 1  , =− νφ
post
dcn
post
dcn 1  ,1  , =−= > νν φφ 22  We may interpret this finding as 
suggesting that Delta, Continental, and Northwest managed to soften competition between 
themselves relative to other competitors in markets where the three virtual codeshare together in 
the post-alliance period.  Thus, there is evidence of a collusive effect in these markets. 
This subtle effect on competition cannot be picked up by the reduced-form econometric 
approach in Gayle (2008), which basically estimates changes in price and quantity over the pre 
                                                 
22 We use a simple standard normal z-test in which the null hypothesis is, H0: , while the 
alternative hypothesis is, H
post
dcn
post
dcn 1  ,1  , =−= = νν φφ
a: .  The computed z score is 1.896, while the critical z for a one tail 
test at 5% level of significance is 1.64. So we reject H
post
dcn
post
dcn 1  ,1  , =−= > νν φφ
0 in favor of Ha. 
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and post-alliance periods that are associated with the codeshare alliance.  The reason is that 
equilibrium price and quantity changes nest both demand and supply effects.  As such, a 
structural econometric model is needed to properly disentangle these effects, which is what we 
have shown in this paper. 
Counterfactual Simulations 
We now use our model to perform counterfactual simulations that reveal how virtual 
codesharing between Delta, Continental, and Northwest in their overlapping markets influenced 
their equilibrium prices, number of passengers, and consumer surplus.  The three counterfactual 
questions we address are: 
 
1.  How would the three airline's equilibrium prices, number of passengers, and consumer 
surplus change if only the demand-increasing effect associated with virtual codesharing was 
removed ( 03 =λ )? 
 
2.  How would the three airline's equilibrium prices, number of passengers, and consumer 
surplus change if competition between all airlines remained uniform ( , which 
effectively removes collusive effects of virtual codesharing) in markets where the three airlines 
virtual codeshare together in the post-alliance period? 
post
dcn
post
dcn 1  ,1  , =−= = νν φφ
 
3.  How would the three airline's equilibrium prices, number of passengers, and consumer 
surplus change if the demand-increasing and collusive effects associated with virtual codesharing 
between these airlines were removed? 
 
The counterfactual experiments hold market conditions in the post-alliance period 
constant and simulate new market equilibria in each of the three cases described above.  So 
actual post-alliance prices, number of passengers, and consumer surplus serve as benchmarks in 
each of the experiments.  Note however that the experiments presume that all competing airlines 
would make the same product characteristic choices in the absence of demand-increasing and/or 
collusive effects associated with virtual codesharing, which might not necessarily be the case.  
To account for endogenous product characteristic choice we would have to significantly modify 
the model to incorporate elements of empirical entry models [Aguirregabiria and Ho (2008), 
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)], which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
We only outline how the model is used to perform counterfactual experiment (3), after 
which it is straightforward to see how counterfactual experiments (1) and (2) are implemented.  
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Similar in spirit to simulation techniques in Nevo (2000), we first use our supply equation to 
recover marginal costs ( ) as follows: wˆ
( )postdcnpostdcnpost 1  ,1  ,3  , , ,ˆ =−=−= νν φφλpmpw  
where p is the vector of actual post-alliance prices.  All demand and supply parameters are set 
equal to their estimated values in Table 1.5.  With  in hand, we can then use the supply 
equation again to solve for the price vector  that satisfy: 
wˆ
∗p
( )410.0 ,0 ,ˆ 1  ,1  ,3 −===+= =−=∗∗ postdcnpostdcnpost νν φφλpmwp    (1.15) 
where 3λ  is counterfactually set equal to 0, and  is counterfactually set equal to -0.410.  
Recall that 
post
dcn 1  , =νφ
3λ  captures the demand-increasing effect of virtual codesharing between the three 
airlines.23  A comparison of p with  reveals how equilibrium prices change as a result of 
counterfactually setting 
∗p
03 =λ  and .  The equilibrium quantity effect associated 
with virtual codesharing between the three airlines is computed by 
410.01  , −==postdcn νφ
( ) ( )0,ˆ, 3*33 =−==Δ λλλ pp jjj sss , where  from Table 1.5,  is the predicted product 
share function in equation (1.4), and product j is offered for sale by either Delta, Continental, or 
Northwest airlines. 
083.03ˆ =λ js
The well-known expression for consumer surplus in the case of the nested logit demand 
model is: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ += ∑
=
−G
g
gDCS
1
)1(1ln1 σα   (1.16) 
Among other things, CS is a function of equilibrium prices and 3λ .  To compute the 
status quo consumer surplus ( ), we evaluate equation (1.16) at actual post-alliance 
market prices and the estimated parameter value of 
33
ˆ, λλ =pCS
3λ  in Table 1.5.  On the other hand, the 
counterfactual consumer surplus is computed at the new simulated market equilibrium prices 
when 3λ  is set equal to 0 and  is set equal to -0.410, that is , where  is the 
predicted equilibrium price vector in the absence of demand-increasing and collusive effects of 
post
dcn 1  , =νφ 0*, 3=λpCS ∗p
                                                 
23 See equation (2) and Table 5. 
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virtual codesharing.  We then compute the change in consumer surplus attributed to these effects 
of virtual codesharing by 0*,ˆ, 333 == −=Δ λλλ pp CSCSCS . 
By only removing the demand-increasing effect of virtual codesharing between the three 
airlines in their overlapping markets (counterfactual experiment (1)), we find that the partners' 
equilibrium prices would fall by a mean 0.0003 percent, while their equilibrium number of 
passengers would fall by a mean 7.95 percent.  On the other hand, by only removing the 
collusive effect (counterfactual experiment (2)), we find that the partners' prices would fall by a 
mean 0.002 percent, while their equilibrium number of passengers would rise by a mean 0.004 
percent.  While the price changes are small, the mean price reduction is larger when we remove 
the collusive effects compared to removing the demand-increasing effects of virtual codesharing.  
On the other hand, the expected opposing quantity (number of passengers) changes attributed to 
demand-increasing versus collusive effects seem to be dominated by the demand-increasing 
effects. 
Next we run counterfactual experiment (3) in which we simultaneously remove demand-
increasing and collusive effects of virtual codesharing between the three airlines.  In this case we 
find that the partners' equilibrium prices would fall by a mean 0.002 percent, while their 
equilibrium number of passengers would fall by a mean 7.95 percent.  In summary, the demand-
increasing and collusive effects of virtual codesharing reinforce each other in their influence of 
the partners' prices, with collusive effects accounting for a larger portion of the relatively small 
price increases in the case of the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance.  On the other 
hand, the demand-increasing and collusive effects of virtual codesharing oppose each other in 
their influence on the partners' number of passengers, with the demand-increasing effect 
dominating in the case of the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance. 
For rough comparative purposes, parameter estimates from the reduced-form econometric 
model in Gayle (2008)24 suggest that virtual codesharing between the three airlines is associated 
with an approximate 1 percent increase in the partners' price25 and an approximate 23 percent 
                                                 
24 See Table 7 in Gayle (2008). 
25 Since price increases depend on the pre-alliance level of city pair concentration (HHIpre in Gayle's 
(2008) reduced-form econometric model), we evaluate the percent price increase at his sample mean pre-alliance 
city pair concentration (HHIpre = 0.532). 
 
34 
increase in the partners' traffic (number of passengers).  Therefore, the price-quantity effects 
generated from our structural econometric model seem to be a little more conservative. 
As described above, our structural econometric model can be used for consumer surplus 
analysis in a straightforward way.  This is another advantage of the econometric model in this 
paper compared to the reduced-form model in Gayle (2008).  By counterfactually removing only 
the demand-increasing effect of virtual codesharing between the three airlines in their 
overlapping markets, we find that consumer surplus falls by a mean 4.12 percent.  Second, by 
only removing the collusive effects we find that consumer surplus increases by a mean 0.002 
percent.  Last, by removing both collusive and demand-increasing effects we find that consumer 
surplus falls by a mean 4.12 percent.  So on net, consumers seem to be better off as a result of the 
virtual codesharing between the three airlines.  These results also reveal that even though virtual 
codesharing is associated with price increases, this type of codesharing nonetheless increases 
consumer surplus owing to its demand-increasing aspects. 
1.7.  Conclusions 
The central question that this paper sets out to answer is:  Has the 
Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance reduced competition between these carriers in 
their overlapping markets?  Specifically, we focused on the market effects of virtual codesharing 
in the three airlines' overlapping markets since this is the only type of codesharing that was 
found to be associated with price increases in previous work [see Gayle (2008)].  To achieve our 
objective, we put together a structural econometric model of air travel demand and supply that is 
tailored to disentangle the demand and supply sources of equilibrium price-quantity changes 
associated with virtual codesharing.  So in addition to answering the specific question we pose, 
we also believe that this paper contributes to the methodology of analyzing the competitive 
effects of codeshare alliances. 
Our two major findings are as follows: (1) econometric estimates for the air travel 
demand equation suggest that virtual codesharing between Delta, Continental, and Northwest has 
a demand-increasing effect associated with it; (2) econometric estimates for the air travel supply 
equation suggest that virtual codesharing between the three airlines in their overlapping markets 
is associated with a softening of competition between them relative to competition between other 
competing airlines.  The demand-increasing effect is consistent with our expectations since 
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passengers that are members of an airline's frequent-flyer program may cumulatively earn and 
redeem frequent-flyer miles across any partner in the alliance.  So the demand-increasing effect 
likely stems from the new opportunities for passengers to earn and redeem frequent-flyer miles 
across alliance partners.  In the case of our collusive effect result, even though we find that 
overall competition is more aggressive in markets where the three airlines compete and virtual 
codeshare together during the post-alliance period, Delta, Continental, and Northwest managed 
to soften competition between themselves relative to other competitors in these markets. 
We use our model to perform counterfactual experiments by simulating new market 
equilibria in the post-alliance period when the demand-increasing and collusive effects of virtual 
codesharing are removed.  These experiments show that the demand-increasing and collusive 
effects of virtual codesharing reinforce each other in their influence of the partners' prices, with 
collusive effects accounting for a larger portion of the relatively small price increases in the case 
of the Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance.  On the other hand, the demand-
increasing and collusive effects of virtual codesharing oppose each other in their influence on the 
partners' number of passengers, with the demand-increasing effect dominating in the case of the 
Delta/Continental/Northwest codeshare alliance. 
Using post-alliance market prices, number of passengers, and consumer surplus as 
benchmarks, removing the demand-increasing and collusive effects resulted in the partners' 
prices falling by a mean 0.002 percent, their number of passengers falling by a mean 7.95 
percent, and consumer surplus falling by a mean 4.12 percent.  On net, this codeshare alliance 
seems to have improved consumer surplus owing to the domination of demand-increasing effects 
over collusive effects, which should be reassuring to policymakers who approved the alliance.  
However, now that we have evidence that a codeshare alliance can be associated with collusive 
effects, policymakers should exercise caution in approving future alliances since collusive effects 
may not always be dominated by demand-increasing effects. 
Last, we should point out that a caveat of our counterfactual experiments is that they 
presume that all competing airlines would make the same product characteristic choices in the 
absence of demand-increasing and/or collusive effects of virtual codesharing between the three 
airlines, which might not necessarily be the case.  A fruitful area for future research is to 
endogenize product characteristic choices of airlines when evaluating the market effects of an 
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alliance.  The empirical industrial organization literature on entry models may prove useful in 
developing such a framework.26
 
 
                                                 
26 See Berry and Reiss (2007) and Doraszelski and Pakes (2007) for reviews of this literature. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Analyzing the Effect of a Merger between Airline 
Codeshare Partners 
2.1.  Introduction 
Market power is often studied in the microeconomic literature for various reasons.  
Industries with high concentration ratios sometimes have higher markups and profits due to the 
firms’ ability to set higher prices.  Mergers are of particular interest in the industrial organization 
literature.  When a merger occurs, the market will become more concentrated, but the net effects 
aren’t always the same – a merger could be harmful by greatly decreasing competition, 
increasing prices, and heightening entry barriers.  A merger may also be beneficial by creating 
cost efficiencies (leading to lower prices), which can be conducive to competition. 
Although there was speculation as far back as February 2008 about a possible merger 
between Delta Airlines and Northwest Airlines,27 Delta announced its plans to acquire Northwest 
on April 14, 2008.28  The combined carrier will operate under the Delta name, be headquartered 
in Atlanta, and operate the nine hubs of both airlines in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. 
Critics believe the merger will cause significant price increases and may even initiate 
other large airline mergers, eventually leading to an industry with less than 5 main competitors.  
If true, this could lead to higher markups and prices if market power could be exercised. 
Proponents, specifically the airlines, argue that the merger will have positive effects, and 
that the positive effects will outweigh any negative effects such as price increases.  If two firms 
wanting to merge can show the benefits of the merger – such as cost efficiencies and increased 
quality of service – the merger has a greater chance of getting approved by the U.S. Department 
of Justice (DoJ).29
On August 6th, 2008, the European Commission gave unconditional clearance for the 
Delta/Northwest merger.  The Commission stated that the merger would not impede effective 
competition in Europe or the trans-Atlantic.  Further, a new development occurred less than two 
                                                 
27 Atlanta Journal-Constitution.  
http://www.ajc.com/business/content/business/delta/stories/2008/02/16/delta_0217.html
28 CNN Money. 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/04/14/news/companies/delta_northwest/index.htm
29 DoJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/4.html
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months later on September 25th when the stockholders of the two companies “overwhelmingly 
approved” the merger. 30  After the shareholders approved, the legal processes continued, and it 
was up to the DoJ to examine the situation to see if the merger would be permitted. 
On October 29th, 2008, the DoJ approved the Delta/Northwest merger, stating that “the 
Division has determined that the proposed merger between Delta and Northwest is likely to 
produce substantial and credible efficiencies that will benefit U.S. consumers and is not likely to 
substantially lessen competition”.31  The integration process will take approximately 2 years to 
complete, and began in January 2009.32
This merger is of particular interest because Delta and Northwest are codeshare partners.  
With codesharing, a trip is ticketed by a single carrier, even though some (or all) of the flights on 
the passenger itinerary are operated by a different carrier, which is the codeshare partner.  This is 
different from a pure online flight itinerary, in which the trip is ticketed and operated by the same 
carrier. 33
There is a growing body of literature that analyzes airline mergers and the effects they 
have on market power and airline fares.  Beutel and McBride (1992) illustrate a direct 
econometric method to estimate the change in market power caused by a merger.  Their results 
indicate that the quantitative effects of a merger are directly related to the  pre-merger market 
power of the merging firms.  Singal (1996) studies the pricing behavior of airlines following 
mergers that occurred in the 1980’s, and finds that changes in market concentration as well as 
changes in multimarket contact can significantly affect fares.  Morrison (1996) uses a unique 
dataset to analyze long-term trends and effects of mergers by looking 7 years before and after a 
merger occurs, paying special attention to routes that were served by both carriers before the 
merger.  For the three mergers studied, fares for the newly merged firm increased immediately 
after the merger, but fell over time to levels at or below competitors’ fares.  Clougherty (2006) 
studies domestic mergers, but argues that these mergers are driven by international competition 
incentives as well as domestic competition incentives.  He finds that domestic mergers lead to an 
                                                 
30 Delta Press Release 
http://news.delta.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=11162
31 Department of Justice Press Release 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/238849.htm
32 Delta Press Release 
http://news.delta.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=11176
33 Formal definitions of codeshare and pure online products are given in Section 2. 
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increased international competitive performance due to network enhancement and network 
consolidation effects.  Peters (2006) uses a counterfactual simulation method in order to predict 
price increases resulting from five airline mergers that occurred in the 1980s, and compares the 
predicted price increases to actual price increases.  The post-merger data allowed differences in 
predicted price changes and actual price changes to be decomposed.  He finds that unobservable 
supply-side factors, namely changes in marginal costs and deviations from the assumed model of 
firm conduct, play a large role in post-merger price increases. Adler and Smilowitz (2007) 
demonstrate a basic framework assuming competitive markets and minimal regulation that 
allows airlines to choose both international network structure and alliances.  They find that both 
alliances and mergers have a positive effect for partners involved but damaging effects for an 
airline that fails to find an alliance or merger partner. 
Other literature has studied the effects of frequent flyer alliances, but with the exception 
of Ito and Lee (2007), Gayle (2008), and Bilotkach (2007), these studies do not address the 
different types of products associated with codesharing with frequent flyer alliances.  Bilotkach 
(2007) examines airline consolidation (defined as forming an alliance and codesharing) using 
transatlantic markets to determine if codesharing with and without antitrust immunity decreases 
fares for interline trips equally.  The results show that codesharing and alliance-forming both 
have fare-decreasing effects, but the codesharing effect is more than twice the magnitude of the 
alliance effect.  As noted in Brueckner and Whalen (2000) and Brueckner (2003), codesharing 
allows airlines to eliminate a double markup on itineraries with multiple operators, resulting in 
lower fares.  Ito and Lee (2007) also show codesharing to be associated with lower fares. 
This paper analyzes potential market effects of the Delta/Northwest merger with a 
particular focus on comparing predicted price changes across different product types (codeshare 
vs. pure online).  To estimate the potential effects of the merger, we use a well-known structural 
econometric framework34 to examine markets in which Delta and Northwest both offer products 
prior to the merger.  Specifically, we use pre-merger data to estimate demand, then use the 
demand parameter estimates along with an assumed price-setting behavior (Bertrand-Nash) of 
airlines to recover product-level marginal costs.  With the product-level marginal costs and 
demand estimates in hand, we use the multiproduct firm Bertrand-Nash pricing framework to 
conduct counterfactual experiments.  One counterfactual experiment we ran is to compute the 
                                                 
34 For examples, see Nevo (2000) and Ivaldi and Verboven (2005). 
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extent to which Delta and Northwest product prices might increase in the worst case scenario in 
which the merger does not produce any efficiency gains.  To the best of our knowledge, our 
paper is the first to examine the potential market effects across different product types of an 
airline merger between codeshare alliance partners. 
The data reveal that Delta and Northwest products are substitutable (competing) in a 
significant number of markets in which they offer products.  Delta offers products in over half of 
the markets in which Northwest offers products, and Northwest offers products in almost half of 
the markets in which Delta offers products.  Thus, antitrust authorities clearly should not grant 
approval of the merger on the grounds that these carriers rarely compete.  Deeper analysis is 
required to assess the extent to which: (1) these two carriers constrain each other’s pricing 
decisions when they compete; (2) other competing carriers would constrain the joint pricing 
behavior of Delta and Northwest.  To examine these issues we use our econometric model to 
predict the extent to which Delta and Northwest’s product prices will increase if these products 
are jointly priced in the worst case scenario where the merger is not associated with cost 
efficiency gains. 
In our sample, Delta and Northwest have a combined 27.1% passenger share in the U.S. 
domestic industry, varying between 0.42% to 100% in different markets.  Based on our 
econometric estimates, the average predicted change in price due to the merger is only an 
increase of 0.62%, hardly big enough to concern consumers.  However, the maximum predicted 
increase in price was over 6%. 
To better understand predicted percent price increases for Delta and Northwest products 
(which varied across markets and product types), we ran auxiliary regressions with predicted 
percent price increases as the dependent variable and various product and market characteristics 
as regressors.  The results reveal a significant positive relationship between the share of 
Delta/Northwest passengers in a market and the predicted increase in prices attributed to the 
merger.  We also find that Delta/Northwest codeshare products have higher predicted price 
increases relative to their pure online products. 
We then analyzed market level (rather than product level) factors that influence the 
predicted price increases.  Our estimates suggest that longer-distance markets are expected to 
experience lower price increases, and that the presence of other airlines offering competing 
products is crucial in keeping the predicted price increases of Delta/Northwest products low. 
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Finally, we were fortunate that the limited amount of post-merger data available (second 
and third quarters of 2009) at the time when this paper was been written had Delta and 
Northwest products still separately identified, even though the merger was long approved by 
antitrust authorities and therefore the two airlines were likely to have started jointly pricing their 
products.  We exploit this window of opportunity and re-estimate our econometric model and 
perform counterfactual “de-merger” simulations with this unique 2009 post-merger data.  
Assuming that these post-merger data are characterized by Delta and Northwest jointly pricing 
their products, our counterfactual “de-merger” analysis suggests that the two airlines’ product 
prices would fall by a mean 0.748% if they separately priced their products, with the maximum 
predicted price reduction being 7.2%.  We found it encouraging that these counterfactual “de-
merger” predicted price changes are consistent with our predicted price changes when pre-
merger data were used to perform counterfactual “merger” simulations. 
The rest of the paper is as follows:  Section 2.2 outlines the demand model while Section 
2.3 details the estimation.  Section 2.4 is devoted to explaining the merger analysis.  Section 2.5 
discusses the data, the results are covered in Section 2.6, and Section 2.7 offers concluding 
remarks. 
2.2.  The Model 
Definitions 
Some definitions are worth mentioning before illustrating the model.  These definitions 
follow from Gayle (2007a and 2008).  A market is defined as an origin-destination combination.  
Markets are directional, meaning that a trip from Los Angeles to New York is a different market 
than a trip from New York to Los Angeles.  This allows us to consider origin city characteristics 
such as population and whether or not the airport is a hub for the carrier offering the air travel 
product for sale.  Directional markets also allow for the use of origin and destination fixed 
effects. 
An itinerary contains the origin and destination of the journey, as well as all of the 
intermediate stops.  Thus, a non-stop flight from Chicago to Seattle is a different itinerary than a 
passenger who flies from Chicago to Seattle with a layover in Denver.  A product is defined as a 
combination of airline(s) and itinerary.  Each flight has a ticketing carrier and an operating 
carrier.  The ticketing carrier is the airline that actually sells the flight ticket to the passenger and 
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is the ‘owner’ of the product.  The operating carrier is the airline that operates the plane that the 
passenger is traveling on for the flight. 
Further, we want to study the effects of a merger on codeshared products relative to pure 
online products.  While all flights have both an operating carrier and ticketing carrier, the 
ticketing carrier and operating carrier could be the same or different for any flight on the 
itinerary.  A pure online product has a single ticketing carrier and operating carrier for the whole 
itinerary and the two carriers are the same.  For example, a passenger buys a single ticket from 
United and flies on two United planes for his itinerary.  A traditional codeshare product has a 
single ticketing carrier for the trip, but multiple operating carriers, one of which is the same as 
the ticketing carrier.  For example, a single ticket is purchased from Delta for a two-flight 
itinerary where one of the planes is operated by Delta and the other is operated by Continental.  
A virtual codeshare product has a single ticketing carrier and operating carrier for the itinerary, 
but the operating and ticketing carriers are different.  For example, a single-flight itinerary is 
ticketed through Northwest, but the flight is operated by Continental.35
Demand 
We start by describing our discrete choice demand model in which a consumer chooses 
one product among many alternatives with the objective of utility maximization.  The consumer 
also has the option to choose an outside alternative (driving, taking a train, or not traveling at 
all). 
Following Berry and Jia (2009) and Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2007), we use a random 
coefficients logit demand model.  The utility function specification allows for two types of 
travelers, leisure (L) or business (B) travelers.  Traveler i who is type { }BLt ,∈ , obtains the 
following utility if product j in market m is chosen:    
ijmigmjmjmttjmijm pxu εσσζξαβ )1( −+++−=     (2.1) 
where  is a vector of non-price observed product characteristics, jmx tβ  is a random traveler-
type-specific vector of parameters that measures the marginal utility of respective non-price 
product characteristics,  is the price of the product, jmp tα  is a measure of the traveler-type-
specific marginal utility of price, jmξ  captures product characteristics that are unobserved by 
                                                 
35 For a more detailed analysis of codesharing, see Gayle (2008), and Ito and Lee (2007). 
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researchers but observed by travelers, and ijmigm εσσζ )1( −+  is a random component of utility 
that is assumed to follow a distribution that yields the “nested logit” choice probability for type t 
travelers. 
Let g = 1, 2,…, G index distinct product groups (nests) within a market, and one 
additional group (g = 0) for the outside good.  Products within the same group are closer 
substitutes than products from different groups.  Products in a market-quarter are grouped by 
non-stop versus products requiring intermediate stop(s) to complete the origin-destination trip.  
igmζ  in equation (2.1) is a random component of utility that is common to all products in group 
g, while σ is a parameter that measures the correlation of the consumers’ utility across products 
belonging to the same group.  If σ  = 1, there is a perfect correlation of preferences for products 
within the same group and the products are perfect substitutes.  If σ  = 0, there is no correlation 
of preferences.  For all values of σ  between 0 and 1 inclusive, the model is consistent with 
utility maximization, and each consumer i chooses the product j that maximizes his utility. 
In what follows, we drop the market index m only to avoid a clutter of notation.  As such, 
the reader should continue to interpret each equation in a market-specific way.  The “within 
group” share of product j among type t consumers is  
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Let tλ  be the percentage of type t consumers in the population, where .  The 
overall market share of product j in any given market is 
{ BLt ,∈ }
( ) BgBgjBLgLgjLj sssss ××+××= ||,,, λλθξpx     (2.4) 
where 1=+ BL λλ , p and x are vectors of observed price and non-price product characteristics 
respectively, w
ξ
 is a vector of unobserved (by researchers) product characteristics.  Since hile 
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LB λλ −= 1 , we only need to estimate Lλ .  The vector of demand parameters to be estimated is, 
( )LBBLL λσβαβαθ ,,,,,= . 
The demand for product j is obtained by:  
( )θ,,, ξpxjj sMd ×= ,      (2.5) 
where M is a measure of the market size, which we assume to be the size of the population in the 
origin city. 
Product Pricing and Marginal Cost 
Each carrier f offers a set Ff of products for sale.  Firm f has a variable profit of 
∑
∈
−=
fFj
jjjf qcp )(π ,       (2.6) 
where  in equilibrium,  is the quantity of tickets for product j sold in the market, 
 is the market demand for product j specified in equation (2.5), p is a  vector of 
product prices, and is the marginal cost incurred from offering product j. 
( )pjj dq = jq
( )pjd 1×J
jc
We assume carriers pricing behavior can be approximated by a simultaneous-move Nash 
game.  Consistent with this assumption, carriers simultaneously choose prices to maximize 
profit, and multiproduct firms take into account that lost sales on one product may be partly 
offset by increased sales on another product.  A multiproduct Nash equilibrium is given by the 
following system of J first order conditions: 
∑
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=+∂
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kk sp
scp 0)(  for all j = 1,…,J.  (2.7) 
Equation (2.7) can be re-written in the following way:  
( )θ,,, ξpxjjj markuppc −= ,   (2.8) 
where ( )θ,,, ξpxjmarkup  is a product markup function, which we subsequently discuss in the 
methodology for merger analysis section. 
We use the following specification for the marginal cost function:  
jjj wc ηγ +=ln       (2.9) 
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where is a vector of observed marginal cost-shifting variables, jw γ  is a vector of cost 
parameters to be estimated, and jη  captures shocks to marginal cost that are unobserved by  
researchers. 
2.3.  Estimation 
We estimate the demand and marginal cost parameters jointly using Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM).  The structural demand and marginal cost error terms needed to construct 
moment conditions are jξ  and jη  respectively.  Constructing moment conditions using jη  is 
straightforward since it enters equation (2.9) linearly.  However, constructing moments using jξ  
is more challenging since it enters equation (2.4) nonlinearly. 
Our estimation strategy involves choosing demand parameters such that observed product 
share, Sj,36 are equal to shares predicted by the demand model, that is, 
( )θ;,, ξpxjj sS =  for all j = 1,…,J    (2.10) 
To construct moment conditions using the structural demand error term, we first invert 
the system of equations characterized by equation (2.10) to solve for the vector of non-price 
unobserved product characteri
ξ
, as a function of demand parameters, observed product 
shares,  prices, and product characteristics,  
stics, 
( )θ;,,1 Spxs−=ξ
e for
.      (2.11) 
Following Berry and Jia (2009) and Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006), we use the 
following “contraction mapping” method to solv
ξ
:  
( ) ( )[ ]θσ ;,,lnln1 11 r-r-r ξpxsSξ −−+=ξ
by r )
,   (2.12) 
where iterations are indexed , ( θ;,, ξpxs  is a vector of predicted product share functions 
based on equation (2.4), and S is a vector of observed product shares. 
 The preceding discussion results in the following moment conditions: 
( ) 0Spxξ =′= θ;,,1 dd Znm ,     (2.13) 
                                                 
36 Observed product shares are computed by 
M
q
S jj = , where  is the quantity of tickets for product j sold in the 
market and M is the size of the population in the origin city. 
jq
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where n is the number of observations in the sample, Zd is a dLn×  matrix of instruments, and 0 
is a   vector of zeros. Moment conditions using the structural error term from the marginal 
cost equation is 
1×dL
( 0pw =′= γ;,,1 markupsZ
n
m ss η )
]
,    (2.14) 
where ( )[ γθ wξpxp −−= ,,,ln markupsη .  Note that the moment conditions in (2.14) also help 
when estimating demand parameters since demand parameters enter these moment conditions 
through the markup function, ( )θ,,, ξpxmarkups . 
The GMM optimization problem is 
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The instruments in matrices Zd and Zs are subsequently discussed. 
Instruments 
For a valid set of demand instruments in Zd, variables are needed that are associated with 
the price of the product but not the error term, jξ .  Without using instruments, the estimated 
price coefficient will be inconsistent.  Our demand instruments include the number of 
competitors in the market, the number of other products offered by the airline, characteristics of 
competing products offered by competitors, itinerary distance, and interactions of these 
variables.  Each instrument has an intuitive explanation for their inclusion.  For the competitors, 
supply theory predicts that a product’s price will be influenced by the number and closeness of 
competitors in the market.  Next, if an airline offers multiple products in the same market, the 
airline will jointly set the prices for these products.  When considering other products, we 
examine competing products with the same number of intermediate stops and similar levels of 
convenience.  The more similarities there are between competing products, the less discrepancy 
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we expect between prices of these products.  The inclusion of itinerary distance is based on the 
idea that distance is correlated with marginal cost and therefore influences price.37
For the supply side, we set 
w=sZ .  In the marginal cost equation, the cost-shifting 
variables in 
w
 are assumed exogenous, and therefore estimates of γ  will not be inconsistent.  
2.4. Methodology used for Merger Analysis 
Following the general procedure described in Nevo (2000), marginal costs are recovered 
by using the estimated demand elasticities and assuming a model of pre-merger pricing conduct.  
The new price equilibrium is computed by using estimated demand elasticities, pre-merger 
marginal costs, and assuming a model of post-merger pricing conduct.  Finally, the predicted 
post-merger equilibrium prices are compared to actual pre-merger prices. 
The first order conditions that characterize optimal price-setting behavior can be written 
using matrix notation as follows: 
0)*. ()( =+ΔΩ×− scp ,     (2.16) 
where p, c, and s are 1×J  vectors of product prices, marginal costs, and predicted product shares 
respectively,Ω  is a  matrix which captures airline ownership structure of the products, .* is 
the operator for element-by-element matrix multiplication, and 
JJ ×
Δ  is a JJ ×  matrix of own and 
cross price effects (
j
j
p
s
∂
∂
 and 
j
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p
s
∂
∂  respectively) for all products with the own-price effects on the 
main diagonal. 
The ownership structure matrix,Ω , consists of zeroes and ones and shows which 
products have the same owner.  Let ijΩ  denote the element in the ith row and jth column of 
matrix Ω , where i and j also index products.  If products i and j are owned by the same firm, 
then , otherwise, .  For example, suppose there is a four-product market where 
there are three airlines, A, B, and C.  Suppose A owns products 1 and 3, B owns product 2, and C 
owns product 4.  The ownership structure would be defined as follows: 
1=ijΩ
                                                
0=Ω ij
 
37 See Gayle (2007a) for similar types of instruments. 
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If one airline owns all the products in a market, the ownership structure would be a JJ ×  
matrix of ones, with J being the number of products in the market. 
Product markups are determined separately for each market.  The markups for products in 
any given market are: scp ×ΔΩ−=−= −1)*. (markups .     (2.17) 
The counterfactual experiment involves specifying both a pre-merger and a post-merger 
product ownership structure.  First, marginal costs are recovered using the pre-merger product 
ownership structure as follows: sp ×ΔΩ+= −1)*. (ˆ prec
here ˆ
,     (2.18) 
w
c
 is the vector of estimated marginal costs for all products and  preΩ  is the pre-merger 
product ownership structure.  Now, assuming a post-merger product ownership structure of 
 and using pre-merger marginal costs, we can compute post-merger equilibrium prices by 
searching for the new price v
postΩ
ector 
*p
]p
rices
 that satisfies 
[ spc ×ΔΩ−= −1** )(*. ˆ post .     (2.19) 
Having solved for post-merger equilibrium p  
*p
pare , we can com
*p
 to 
p
 to predict 
how the merger would affect prices.38
Based on the ownership matrix preΩ , Delta and Northwest separately and independently 
set the price of their products within a market for which each of them are a ticketing carrier.  
This is true for all their product types – pure online, traditional codeshare, and virtual codeshare.  
In the case of the  ownership matrix, these Delta/Northwest products in the market are all 
jointly priced by the new ticketing carrier formed by the merger of Delta and Northwest. 
postΩ
2.5.  Data 
                                                 
38 Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) provide another application of this model by studying horizontal mergers approved by 
the European Commission. 
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Data are gathered from the DB1B market survey, published by the U.S. Department of 
Transportation.  This dataset is a quarterly 10% sample of all flight itineraries in the U.S.  Each 
observation in the dataset is a flight itinerary and includes information on operating and ticketing 
carriers, fares, passengers, intermediate stops, total itinerary distance, and the number of airports 
in the origin and destination city.  Data was collected for four quarters:  2007:2, 2007:3, 2007:4, 
and 2008:1.  Only markets that appear in all four quarters and include both Delta and Northwest 
itineraries are used for analysis.  The data are further restricted to include only itineraries in the 
contiguous U.S., and foreign operating carriers such as Air France and Iberia are eliminated.  
Further, observations were dropped that listed market fares less than $25 – this helps us avoid 
discounted fares that may be due to employee travel or passengers using frequent-flyer miles.39
Collapsing the Data 
Each quarter of data originally had over 5 million observations, making the data 
extremely large and unmanageable.  Due to the airlines being very effective at using yield 
management, there are many identical itineraries that have different observed fares.  This leads to 
the dataset containing many repeat itineraries each listed as having passengers paying different 
fares.  To render our data more manageable, the dataset was collapsed by product – for each 
quarter, passengers were aggregated over a given itinerary-airline(s) combination (this created 
the quantity variable) and the average market fare was found, creating the price variable.  In the 
collapsed data set, each airline(s)-itinerary-quarter combination appears only once, with its 
aggregated passenger quantity and average market fare.  Following Berry (1992), we then 
eliminate itineraries that have less than 50 passengers for the quarter.40
Creation of Other Variables 
From this collapsed dataset, observed product market shares  are created.  For the 
purpose of properly identifying codeshare products in the data, feeder/regional operating carriers 
are recoded to match their major company.
jS
41  For example, Comair Delta Connection (OH) was 
recoded as Delta (DL).  Airline dummies are created, as well as indicators for whether the 
                                                 
39 See Ito and Lee (2007) and Brueckner (2003). 
40 Berry eliminated itineraries that had less than 90 passengers for the quarter. 
41 If we did not recode operating feeder carriers to have their major carrier code, then products that have the major 
carrier as the ticketing carrier and associated regional feeder carrier(s) as operating carrier(s) will mistakenly be 
counted as codeshare products since the operating and ticketing carrier codes would differ. 
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itinerary was pure online, traditional codeshared, or virtual codeshared.  Ticketing carriers that 
appeared less than 50 times were dropped – this eliminated 6 smaller ticketing carriers that 
combined to make up only 135 observations.  The final set of ticketing carriers is presented in 
Table 2.1.  A dummy variable hub_origin was created indicating whether the origin airport is a 
hub for the ticketing carrier. 
A measure of product convenience is created as well, and is defined as itinerary distance 
divided by nonstop_miles, where nonstop_miles is the direct flight distance between origin and 
destination.  Thus, the most convenient itinerary for a given market would be a direct flight from 
origin to destination.  Because of how the variable is defined, the minimum value for convenient 
is equal to 1. 
Table 2.1  Airlines represented in the dataset 
Code Airline 
AA American Airlines 
AS Alaskan Airlines 
B6 JetBlue Airways 
CO Continental Airlines 
DL Delta Airlines 
F9 Frontier Airlines 
FL Airtran Airways 
NW Northwest Airlines 
UA United Airlines 
US US Airways 
WN Southwest Airlines 
YX Midwest Airlines 
 
 
For our purposes, each itinerary needs to have an ‘owner’, so itineraries that were listed 
as having multiple ticketing carriers were discarded from the sample.  After each product is listed 
as having a single owner, product types are created and are denoted as pure online, traditional 
codeshare, and virtual codeshare.   
Quarter dummies and fixed effects for the origin and destination are added to the dataset 
as well.  Thus, observed product characteristics ( ) include the following variables: 
convenience, a dummy indicating whether or not the flight is nonstop, hub origin indicator, 
codeshare type, quarter, airline indicator, and the origin and destination fixed effects.  After 
cleaning and collapsing the data, the combined four quarters contain 10,217 observations across 
1,936 markets. 
jx
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In order to assess the degree of substitutability across Delta and Northwest products, we 
analyzed the original dataset before performing any of the data cleaning described above.  For 
each quarter, we examine the number of markets and the presence of Delta/Northwest in the 
markets.  Table 2.2 shows the results. 
We can clearly see that Delta offers products in over half of the markets in which 
Northwest offers products, and Northwest offers products in almost half of the markets in which 
Delta offers products.  This implies Delta and Northwest products are substitutes for each other 
in almost half of the markets where either firm offers products.  Summary statistics of the 
samples used for estimation are presented in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.2 Dual Presence of Delta and Northwest in Markets 
 Markets 
Quarter Total With DL With NW With Both 
2007:2 56514 28131 22766 12549 
2007:3 57314 28810 22329 12425 
2007:4 56024 27566 22416 12293 
2008:1 53228 25994 21591 11840 
 
 
Table 2.3 Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
        
Itinerary Distance 1684.165 651.854 229 3407 
Nonstop Distance 1579.626 620.780 229 2625 
Quantity 283.822 627.665 50 8510 
Price 2.036 0.515 0.805 4.511 
Convenient 1.074 0.118 1 2.399 
Nonstop 0.215 0.411 0 1 
Pure Online 0.951 0.216 0 1 
Traditional Codeshare 0.008 0.086 0 1 
Virtual Codeshare 0.042 0.200 0 1 
Hub Origin 0.129 0.335 0 1 
Spring 0.269 0.444 0 1 
Summer 0.266 0.442 0 1 
Autumn 0.245 0.430 0 1 
Winter 0.220 0.414 0 1 
     
Observations 10217    
 
 
2.6.  Results 
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Variable signs and significance 
The demand results are shown in Table 2.4. We start by estimating a simple nested logit 
demand specification that does not allow for different consumer types.42  Results for this simple 
demand model specification are reported in the panels labeled OLS and 2SLS.  An important 
difference between the OLS and 2SLS regressions is noticeable in the price coefficient.  In the 
OLS regression, the price coefficient is biased (and has the wrong sign), once again illustrating 
the need to instruments for this endogenous variable.  The large variation in estimates between 
the OLS and 2SLS regressions once again illustrates the importance of using instruments for 
endogenous variables.  Estimates of σ are between 0 and 1 with significance, implying that the 
model is consistent with utility maximization. 
                                                 
42 In the case of the simple nested logit demand specification, the linear equation we estimate is given by:  ( ) ( ) ( ) jgjjjj SpxSS ξσαβ ++−=− /0 lnlnln . 
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Table 2.4 Demand Regression Results 
  OLS  2SLS  GMM 
Variable          
"Leisure" Type          
Price (hundreds)  0.009 (0.015)  -0.307** (0.038)  -6.099** (0.550) 
Convenient  -0.189** (0.053)  -0.420** (0.061)  -0.458** (0.126) 
Nonstop  1.316** (0.018)  1.657** (0.027)  1.113** (0.333) 
Constant  -7.552** (0.190)  -6.103** (0.235)  -3.805 (2.305) 
          
"Business" Type          
Price (hundreds)        -1.206** (0.014) 
Convenient        -0.778** (0.092) 
Nonstop        1.838** (0.040) 
Constant        -2.499** (0.284) 
          
Hub Origin  0.204** (0.020)  0.339** (0.024)  0.563** (0.020) 
Virtual Codeshare  -0.376** (0.031)  -0.810** (0.045)  -0.888** (0.019) 
Traditional Codeshare  -0.094 (0.063)  -0.279** (0.072)  -0.228** (0.003) 
Spring  0.105** (0.015)  0.044* (0.018)  0.032** (0.000) 
Summer  0.099** (0.016)  0.049** (0.018)  0.035** (0.004) 
Autumn  0.040** (0.016)  0.001 (0.018)  -0.009** (0.000) σ   0.492** (0.008)  0.131** (0.024)  0.041** (0.000) 
Lλ         0.697** (0.100) 
          
Marginal Cost Parameters          
Itinerary Distance        0.543** (0.021) 
Itinerary Distance2        -0.072** (0.005) 
Spring        -0.056** (0.002) 
Summer        -0.050** (0.001) 
Autumn        -0.031** (0.000) 
Constant        -0.485** (0.018) 
          
R-squared  0.850   0.810     
Wu-Hausman F test:  252.612** F(2,10030)       
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test  489.977** Chi-sq(2)       
The regressions include fixed effects for airlines, origin, and destination, even though the coefficients are not reported. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
*   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
To test the validity of the instruments, we regressed both endogenous variables against 
the instruments using OLS and also performed a Hausman test.  The results show that each 
instrument is strongly correlated with the endogenous variables.  These results are shown in 
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Appendix B.  Each instrument used is correlated with significance to at least one of the 
endogenous variables.  Hausman tests shown in Table 2.4 also reject the exogeneity of price 
and ( )gjS /ln , implying that instruments are needed.43
The coefficient on nonstop is positive and significant in all regressions, as expected.  
Passengers prefer direct flights from origin to destination –intermediate stops during the itinerary 
lead to lower levels of utility.  The convenient coefficient also has the expected negative sign for 
all regressions, and is significant in each case.  Recall that this variable is defined as itinerary 
miles flown divided by nonstop miles, and would thus have a higher value for flights that are 
more “out of the way”.  Thus, the negative coefficient suggests intuitively that passengers prefer 
the most direct route to the destination.  The hub_origin coefficient is positive, indicating that 
consumers prefer flying out of an airline's hub, perhaps due to more convenient gate locations 
and departure times.  The seasonal dummy coefficient estimates suggest that demand is subject 
to seasonal effects. 
The traditional codeshare variable has a negative and significant coefficient – note that 
the “left out” product type category is pure online, so this indicates that a traditional codeshare 
product has a lower demand relative to a pure online product.  Recall that there are multiple 
operating carriers on this type of codeshare itinerary.  The negative sign may be capturing some 
unobserved handiness effects of traditional codeshare relative to pure online itineraries.  A pure 
online itinerary is very streamlined, and a company can better organize its own planes and 
schedules to minimize layover time and efficiently organize gates at airports.  With a traditional 
codeshare flight, a passenger may be more likely to experience longer layovers or longer 
journeys through the airport to find a different gate.  Even though codeshare partners try to 
coordinate their efforts in this manner, the negative coefficient on traditional codeshare suggests 
that these coordination efforts are not perfect.  The coefficient on virtual is negative and 
significant.  Moreover, it is greater in magnitude than the coefficient on traditional.  As 
previously noted in Ito and Lee (2007), this negative coefficient could be due to the fact that 
virtual codeshare itineraries are a relatively inferior product – frequent flyer miles may often not 
be used, and first-class upgrades are usually unavailable on this type of itinerary. 
                                                 
43 The Hausman test presents a null hypothesis of price and ( )gjS /ln  being exogenous.  The Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
chi-square test with two degrees of freedom rejects the null hypothesis with over 99.99% confidence. 
55 
We now discuss results from our full model that includes cost parameters and allows for 
different consumer types.  These results are reported in the panel of Table 2.4 labeled GMM.  
The coefficients associated with, price, constant, convenient, and nonstop are allowed to differ 
by consumer type.   These consumer type-specific coefficients all have the correct sign.  More 
importantly, the "business" type coefficients  have the correct magnitude relative to the "leisure" 
type coefficients.  The business type traveler's demand is affected less by higher prices, perhaps 
because his travel will be reimbursed by his employer.  Further, the business traveler will most 
likely have a tighter time constraint than the leisure traveler, and thus has a stronger preference 
toward convenient, nonstop flights.  The constant term for the business traveler is greater (less 
negative) than the constant term for the leisure traveler, indicating that business travelers have a 
greater preference for airline travel as opposed to the outside good relative to the leisure 
travelers. 
The main cost parameters of interest in the GMM model give the expected signs.  Cost 
increases with distance, but the negative coefficient on the distance squared variable shows this 
relationship is not linear. 
Demand Elasticities 
Along with the demand parameter estimates reported in Table 2.4, we computed the 
average own- and cross-price elasticity of Delta and Northwest products.  The average own-price 
elasticity of Delta / Northwest products is -2.44 and the average cross-price elasticity of Delta / 
Northwest products is 0.06.  As argued by Oum, Gillen and Noble (1986) and Brander and 
Zhang (1990), a reasonable range for own price elasticity in the airline industry is from -1.2 to -
2.0.  Peters (2006) found own price elasticity estimates ranging from -3.2 to -3.6.  Thus, we feel 
comfortable that the elasticity estimates generated from our model are reasonable and accord 
with evidence in the existing literature. 
Merger Analysis 
Since our main objective is to analyze the merger, recall that our dataset includes only 
markets that contain both Delta and Northwest products before the merger.44  This will allow us 
to isolate the merger effects in markets where the two firms’ services overlap.  Summary 
                                                 
44 Markets that include neither firm or just one of the two firms will not experience a price increase according to our 
model since the ownership structure of products will be the same before and after the merger. 
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statistics for variables of interest in the subsample are displayed in Table 2.5.  The average pre-
merger markup is approximately $80.96.  The average predicted change in price is only an 
increase of 0.62%, hardly big enough to concern consumers, let alone antitrust authorities.  
However, the maximum predicted increase in price is over 6%. 
Table 2.5 Summary Statistics for Merger Analysis 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pre-merger marginal costs 122.291 50.571 0.235 367.870 
Pre-merger markup 80.955 3.039 77.263 91.678 
Post-merger predicted price 199.418 49.583 82.117 427.969 
Predicted Price Increases (percent) 0.622 1.019 1.56E-06 6.258 
Delta/Northwest pre-merger 
combined market product share 42.704 31.729 0.418 100 
Delta/Northwest pre-merger 
combined market passenger share 45.445 25.146 7.692 100 
 
 
To obtain a more detailed analysis of Delta/Northwest dominance in different markets, 
we calculated the combined passenger share that Delta and Northwest had in each market.  For 
example, if 1,000 passengers flew from Minneapolis to Atlanta and 400 of them flew on Delta or 
Northwest tickets, then the Delta/Northwest share for this market is 40%.  Note that this share is 
calculated by passengers, and not by the number of flights.  This is displayed in the last row in 
Table 2.5.  On average, Delta and Northwest combined own 45.445% of the passenger share in 
markets where both firms competed before the merger. 
Summary statistics (not reported in Table 2.5) suggest a positive relationship between 
pre-merger Delta/Northwest combined market passenger share and predicted price increases.  As 
shown in Table 2.5, all products and markets considered, the average predicted percent increase 
in price is 0.62% and the average pre-merger Delta/Northwest combined passenger share in 
markets is 45.44.  However, for products with a predicted price increase between 1% and 3%, the 
average Delta/Northwest combined passenger share in the market is 48.14%, and for predicted 
price increases of 3% or more, the average Delta/Northwest combined passenger share in the 
market is 71.09%.  Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of predicted price increases. 
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Figure 2.1 Distribution of Predicted Price Increases 
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To fully examine the association between Delta/Northwest pre-merger combined 
passenger share and predicted price increases, we regress the predicted percent change in prices 
as a function of the Delta/Northwest combined passenger share (Quantshare_DLNW) as well as 
some other control variables.  We also regress the pre-merger price as a function of these same 
variables.  The estimates are displayed in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6 Decomposition of Predicted Price Increases 
  Predicted Price Increase  Pre-Merger Price 
Quantshare_DLNW  0.015*** (0.001)  0.001 (0.000) 
Convenient  0.781*** (0.167)  -0.534*** (0.062) 
Nonstop  -0.835*** (0.063)  0.277*** (0.023) 
Itin Distance / 1000  -0.359*** (0.059)  0.466*** (0.022) 
Virtual Codeshare  0.607*** (0.102)  0.056 (0.038) 
Traditional Codeshare  0.707* (0.419)  -0.331** (0.155) 
Spring  0.157*** (0.045)  -0.027 (0.017) 
Summer  0.101** (0.046)  -0.067*** (0.017) 
Autumn  0.135*** (0.046)  -0.080*** (0.017) 
Delta Dummy  -0.233*** (0.033)  0.106*** (0.012) 
Constant  -1.341*** (0.421)  2.878*** (0.156) 
       
The regressions include fixed effects for airlines, origin, and destination, even though the coefficients are not reported. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
*   Statistically significant at the 10% level 
**   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
These results allow us to see what factors determine the predicted post-merger price 
increases.  The regressions show that prices are predicted to increase by larger amounts when 
Delta/Northwest combine for a larger pre-merger passenger share in a market.  However, while 
these results are statistically significant, they are not economically significant.  The positive 
coefficient on convenient and negative coefficient on nonstop suggest that the airlines may not 
raise prices on the most desirable itineraries.  The coefficients on traditional codeshare and 
virtual codeshare are positive, implying that these types of products will experience higher price 
increases (in terms of percentages) relative to pure online products.  To examine this further, we 
regressed the pre-merger price against market and product characteristics and found a 
statistically insignificant coefficient on virtual codeshare but a statistically significant negative 
coefficient on the traditional codeshare variable.  Thus, the price regression in the right panel of 
Table 2.6 suggests that, on average, Delta and Northwest virtual codeshare products are priced 
relatively similar to their pure online products in the pre-merger period, but the predicted price 
increase regression in the left panel suggests that Delta and Northwest virtual codeshare 
products’ prices will increase by more than their prices for pure online products.  In the case of 
the two airlines’ traditional codeshare products, we see that these products are priced lower than 
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the two airlines pure online products, but these codeshare products are predicted to experience 
marginally higher price increases compared to their pure online products. 
Although the results in Table 2.6 suggest that both types of codeshare products on 
average have higher predicted price increases compared to pure online products, it is useful to 
see the distribution of price increases among codeshare products.  To see the distribution pattern 
a little more clearly, we created a 100% stacked column chart in Figure 2.2 to show the percent 
of each product type in each price increase range.45  The figure reveals that codeshare products 
tend to be slightly weighted toward the largest price increases. 
Figure 2.2 Distribution of Predicted Price Increases among Codeshare Types 
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Figures 2.1 and 2.2 use only information about product types before the merger.  
However, products may change type classification after Delta and Northwest merge because the 
ownership structure of the products changes.  Specifically, one of three things could happen to 
Delta/Northwest’s products after the merger: 
 
1.  A pure online product remains a pure online product 
2.  A codeshare product remains a codeshare product 
3.  A codeshare product becomes a pure online product 
                                                 
45 A 100% stacked column chart is used instead of a regular column chart to account for the large difference in the 
absolute number of pure online products compared to codeshare products. 
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 For ease of analysis, we sort these products into three groups according to the number of 
cases above.  The reason why product groups two and three arise is that Delta, Northwest, and 
Continental are codeshare alliance partners prior to the Delta/Northwest merger.  As such, many 
of Delta and Northwest’s codeshare products involve Continental as an operating carrier, and 
therefore these products retain their classification as codeshare products after our simulated 
Delta/Northwest merger.  However, the codeshare products that only involve Delta and 
Northwest as either operating or ticketing carriers, will become pure online products with the 
simulated Delta/Northwest merger. 
It is of particular interest to see if these three scenarios differ in terms of predicted price 
increases.  We examine this in the left panel of Table 2.7, which includes only Delta/Northwest 
products.  Using OLS, we regress the predicted price increase against a set of product group 
dummy variables and other control variables to gain information about cases two and three 
described above.  On the right panel of Table 2.7, we use pre-merger price as the dependent 
variable instead of predicted price increase. 
We observe some interesting effects for the groups.  Note that group 1 is the excluded 
category, which are products that were pure online before the merger.  We see positive and 
statistically significant coefficients on the Group 2 and Group 3 dummies, with a particularly 
large coefficient on Group 3, indicating that pre-merger codeshare products which become pure 
online products after the simulated merger experience higher predicted price increases.  Further, 
the right side of Table 2.7 shows that there is not a significant difference in pre-merger prices 
across product groups 1, 2, and 3.  Thus, it is not simply a difference in pre-merger price levels 
that is causing the significant difference in predicted percent price increases. 
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Table 2.7 Determinants of Predicted Price Increases and Pre-merger Prices when 
Delta/Northwest Codeshare Products are Decomposed into Groups 
  Dependent Variable 
Regressors  Predicted Price Increase  Pre-merger Price 
Group 2  0.335* (0.138)  -0.009 (0.058) 
Group 3  1.572** (0.211)  -0.091 (0.088) 
Quantshare_DLNW  0.013** (0.001)  0.006** (0.000) 
Convenient  1.500** (0.197)  -0.556** (0.083) 
Nonstop  -1.063** (0.070)  0.354** (0.030) 
Pop (100K)  0.020** (0.005)  -0.012** (0.002) 
Spring  -0.001 (0.063)  0.031 (0.026) 
Summer  -0.074 (0.065)  0.048 (0.027) 
Autumn  -0.003 (0.065)  -0.034 (0.027) 
Itin. Distance / 1000  -0.463** (0.037)  0.389** (0.015) 
Constant  -0.063 (0.239)  1.630** (0.100) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
*   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
Finally, we examine competition at the market level.  To do this, dummy variables are 
created to indicate the presence of competitors in the market.  Next, we calculated the 25th, 50th, 
and 75th percentile of predicted price increases in each market so as to capture what is happening 
at contrasting points of the predicted price increase distribution.  The predicted price increases 
are regressed against the Delta/Northwest combined passenger share, competitors, and market 
characteristics including nonstop distance, origin city population, and the number of itineraries in 
the market.  Each observation in the regressions represents a market rather than a product.  The 
results are shown in Table 2.8. 
The coefficient on Delta/Northwest combined passenger share is positive, but 
economically insignificant, implying that Delta and Northwest product prices are predicted to 
increase by a marginally greater amount when their combined pre-merger passenger share in the 
market is larger.  The origin city population coefficient is positive in two of the regressions 
implying that larger cities are predicted to experience higher price increases relative to smaller 
cities.  The coefficients on nonstop miles are negative in all regressions, illustrating that longer-
distance markets are expected to have lower price increases.  The number of itineraries in the 
market seems to have no effect on predicted price increases; a larger effect can be seen with the 
actual competitors that offer products in the market, shown by airline dummies.  The market 
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airline dummy coefficients show that American, Frontier, Airtran, and Southwest tend to have 
the greatest effect in keeping predicted post-merger prices lower for Delta/Northwest products. 
Table 2.8 Percent Predicted Price Increases at Various Market Percentiles 
  Market Percentile 
Variable  25  50  75 
Quantshare_DLNW  -0.001 (0.001)  0.004* (0.002)  0.009** (0.002) 
Origin Population (100K)  0.015* (0.007)  0.012 (0.008)  0.022* (0.010) 
Nonstop Miles (1,000)  -0.160** (0.061)  -0.228** (0.069)  -0.324** (0.087) 
Itineraries in Market  -0.008 (0.020)  -0.016 (0.022)  0.041 (0.028) 
American Airlines  -0.359** (0.071)  -0.383** (0.080)  -0.476** (0.102) 
Alaskan Airlines  -0.296 (0.151)  -0.264 (0.170)  -0.551* (0.216) 
JetBlue Airways  -0.293 (0.193)  -0.364 (0.218)  -0.450 (0.275) 
Continental Airlines  -0.056 (0.079)  -0.054 (0.089)  -0.162 (0.112) 
Frontier Airlines  -0.633** (0.079)  -0.682** (0.089)  -0.847** (0.112) 
Airtran Airways  -0.443** (0.072)  -0.457** (0.081)  -0.403** (0.103) 
United Airlines  -0.031 (0.079)  -0.044 (0.089)  -0.058 (0.112) 
US Airways  -0.141* (0.069)  -0.034 (0.078)  -0.059 (0.098) 
Southwest  -0.206** (0.075)  -0.190* (0.085)  -0.332** (0.107) 
Midwest  0.090 (0.123)  0.138 (0.138)  0.147 (0.174) 
constant  1.813** (0.132)  2.072** (0.149)  2.310** (0.188) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
*   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
Post-Merger Data Analysis 
So far, we have done a merger analysis using pre-merger data to estimate predicted price 
increases as a result of the merger in the worst-case scenario in which the firms realize zero cost 
efficiencies from merging.  However, as of this writing of our paper, a small amount of post-
merger data is available.  In this dataset, Delta and Northwest products are still separately 
identified, but we assume that the products are jointly priced since the data are from quarters 
after the firms began to integrate. 
We estimate demand and perform a counterfactual “de-merger” analysis on this post-
merger data similar to the analyses done on the pre-merger data.  However, a key difference is 
that instead of doing a merger simulation with this data, the counterfactual simulation involves 
assuming that Delta and Northwest separately price their products.  Demand parameter estimates 
for the post-merger data are reported in Appendix B.  The summary statistics from the 
counterfactual simulation are shown in Table 2.9. 
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Table 2.9 Summary Statistics for Post Merger Data 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Jointly-priced Delta/Northwest Price 183.134 45.698 65.920 522.549 
Jointly-priced marginal costs 109.132 44.059 0.099 438.578 
Jointly-priced markup 74.001 3.080 65.370 85.456 
Separate ownership predicted price 178.431 46.101 75.524 500.772 
Predicted Price Changes (percent) -0.748 1.254 -7.227 -1.10E-06 
Delta/Northwest combined market 
product share 50.503 31.682 0.658 100 
Delta/Northwest combined market 
passenger share 44.658 24.180 8.333 100 
 
 
First, notice that the combined product and passenger share for Delta and Northwest is 
similar to the pre-merger data.  As expected, when products are priced separately by Delta and 
Northwest, these products are predicted to have lower prices compared to when they are jointly 
priced.  Specifically, the simulation shows that the average Delta / Northwest price will decrease 
by 0.748% when the products are priced separately relative to jointly, with the largest predicted 
price decrease being 7.227%.  The predicted price changes in Table 2.9 roughly coincide with 
our predictions from pre-merger data in Table 2.5. 
2.7.  Conclusions 
Using a structural econometric model and pre-merger data, this paper studied the 
potential effects of the Delta/Northwest merger.  Our findings suggest that, on average, the 
merger will not cause significant price increases.  However, we predict larger price increases in 
markets that are dominated by Delta and Northwest, and that certain products are expected to 
have price increases much greater than the average.  To prevent market power abuse in 
concentrated markets, the DoJ may want to carefully monitor prices and behavior in markets that 
have the largest combined Delta/Northwest passenger shares.  The presence of competing 
airlines, particularly Southwest and American, also helps keep predicted price increases lower. 
Delta and Northwest codeshare products, both traditional and virtual, have larger 
predicted price increases in terms of percentages relative to their pure online products.  In 
addition, Delta/Northwest codeshare products that become pure online products in the post-
merger scenario experience higher predicted price increases than pre-merger pure online 
products and products that remain codeshared with other airlines. 
64 
Finally, using post-merger data, a counterfactual "de-merger" simulation gives price 
changes of similar magnitude to that of the pre-merger data merger simulation. 
This paper adds to the relatively sparse literature studying the pricing of pure online 
versus codeshare product types.  To our knowledge, it is the only paper that examines changes in 
prices of different product types as the result of a merger. 
Future work may involve studying international markets rather than just US markets.  A 
major selling-point of the merger on a worldwide scale is that the only non-stop overlap market 
for Delta and Northwest is New York-Amsterdam.  Delta and Northwest have antitrust immunity 
on this route to coordinate services even if the merger had failed.46  Thus, significant 
international price effects are unlikely. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Hearing on:  Impact of Consolidation on the Aviation Industry, with a Focus on the Proposed Merger between 
Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines 
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 CHAPTER 3 - Mergers Triggering Mergers:  A Simulation Analysis 
of Merging Airline Codeshare Partners 
3.1.  Introduction and Background 
The airline industry has experienced many changes over the years, including deregulation 
in 1978, many mergers (with some large mergers in the 1980’s), bankruptcies, and bailouts.  In 
October 2008, another notable event occurred; the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DoJ) approved a merger between Delta and Northwest, two of the largest firms in the 
industry.  The DoJ stated that “the Division has determined that the proposed merger between 
Delta and Northwest is likely to produce substantial and credible efficiencies that will benefit 
U.S. consumers and is not likely to substantially lessen competition”.47  However, like many 
mergers, the union of Delta and Northwest was not without critics.  James Oberstar, Minnesota 
Democratic Congressman and chairman of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
stated that “This should not be and must not be considered a standalone, individual transaction 
but rather as the trigger of what will surely be a cascade of subsequent mergers that will 
consolidate aviation in the United States and around the world into global, mega carriers.”48
This paper subjects Congressman Oberstar’s statement to an econometric analysis.  Three 
major mergers in the 1980’s occurred within a period of less than two years.49  Thus, it may 
seem that airline mergers may indeed not be standalone incidents, but could have the potential to 
occur in clusters.  More mergers may be discussed, and are more likely to be approved if firms 
show they are no longer viable by themselves, possibly due to economic recession. 
Keeping a possible scenario of multiple mergers in mind, I perform simulations in which 
more mergers occur after the Delta / Northwest merger.  Specifically, the firms in these 
additional mergers, like the Delta / Northwest merger, will be codeshare partners.  I consider five 
additional merger scenarios beyond the original Delta / Northwest merger: 
                                                 
47 Department of Justice Press Release 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/238849.htm
48 CNN Money. 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/05/14/news/companies/airline_merge/index.htm?postversion=2008051418
49 Northwest and Republic in July 1986, Transworld and Ozark in September 1986, and USAir and Piedmont 
Aviation in October 1987.  Singal (1996) studies the pricing behavior of airlines following the mergers that occurred 
in the 1980’s. 
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1.  American Airlines merges with Alaska Airlines 
2.  United Airlines merges with Continental Airlines 
3.  United, Continental, and US Airways merge 
4.  All of the above mergers happen 
5.  The airline industry becomes an unregulated monopoly 
 
This paper aims to expand upon the work of Brown and Gayle (2009), who studied the 
Delta/Northwest merger using a counterfactual simulation.  This work provides insight in 
predicting a “double” worst-case scenario:  First, a “rough” economy and an already-approved 
Delta/Northwest merger act as a catalyst for a string of other mergers, and second, each merger 
has zero cost efficiencies.  A discrete choice nested logit demand model is used in which demand 
parameters are utilized in conjunction with a multiproduct Bertrand-Nash supply side assumption 
to estimate firms’ marginal costs.  A counterfactual simulation involves modeling a “worst-case” 
scenario in which the estimated marginal costs remain constant after a merger, allowing only 
prices to change. 
The data reveal that the Delta/Northwest merger by itself has average price increases of 
0.30%, close to the previous estimate of 0.54% found by Brown and Gayle (2009).  However, 
the variance in predicted price increases is large, ranging from 0% to 13.1%, suggesting that if 
any (or all) of the mergers were to occur, the DoJ may need to monitor markets in which the 
highest price increases are expected.  The results also reveal a general preference for pure online, 
nonstop products as well as itineraries departing from a hub airport. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 3.2 outlines the model and some 
common airline definitions while Section 3.3 details the estimation technique.  The data are 
discussed in Section 3.4, and results are discussed in Section 3.5.  Section 3.6 ends with some 
concluding notes. 
3.2.  The Model 
Definitions 
The model follows from Brown and Gayle (2009), and some definitions are useful prior 
to describing the model in detail.50  A market is an origin-destination combination.  Markets are 
                                                 
50 The definitions follow from Ito and Lee (2007) and Gayle (2007 and 2008).   
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directional, meaning that a trip from Miami to Seattle is a different market than a trip from 
Seattle to Miami.  Defining markets as directional allows the model to account for origin 
characteristics such as city population and whether the origin airport is a hub for the carrier 
offering the product.  An itinerary consists of the origin, destination, and all intermediate stops.  
In the Miami-Seattle market, an itinerary with a layover in Chicago would be a different itinerary 
than a non-stop flight.  A product is a unique grouping of airline(s) and itinerary. 
In terms of ownership and flight service, each flight has a ticketing carrier and an 
operating carrier.  The ticketing carrier sells the ticket and is the “owner” of the product.  The 
operating carrier is the airline that operates the plane the passenger is seated on for the flight(s).  
The ticketing carrier and operating carrier could be the same or different for any flight on the 
itinerary, resulting in a different type of product.  A pure online product has a single ticketing 
and operating carrier for the itinerary, and the two carriers are the same.  For instance, a 
passenger purchases a single ticket from Delta and flies on two Delta-operated planes for his 
itinerary.  A traditional codeshare product has a single ticketing carrier but multiple operating 
carriers, one of which is the same as the ticketing carrier.  For example, a single Delta ticket is 
purchased for a two-flight itinerary where one of the planes is operated by Delta and the other by 
Northwest.  Finally, a virtual codeshare product has a single ticketing carrier and operating 
carrier for the itinerary, but the carriers are different.  For example, an itinerary is ticketed 
through Northwest, but the passenger flies on a plane operated by Continental. 
Demand 
A discrete choice nested logit demand model is estimated in which a consumer chooses 
one product among many alternatives with the goal of utility maximization.  The consumer also 
has the choice of an “outside” alternative (driving, taking a train, or not traveling at all).  The 
model defines G groups of products with one additional group for the outside good, where 
products within a group are closer substitutes than products from across groups.  In this paper, a 
group of products has the same market, number of intermediate stops, and codeshare type.  
Nesting by market is an obvious first step; itineraries that have the same origin and destination 
will be closer substitutes than products with different starting and ending points.  Further nesting 
by the number of intermediate stops implies that consumers will view nonstop itineraries within 
the market differently than itineraries with a layover.  Finally, previous literature suggests that 
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nesting further by codeshare type may also reflect consumer preferences.  Ito and Lee (2007) 
state that codeshare itineraries are relatively inferior because frequent flyer miles may be 
unredeemable and first-class upgrades are usually unavailable.  Armantier and Richard (2008) 
state that consumers may dislike codeshare itineraries because the flight is operated by a firm 
that they didn’t buy the ticket from, and there may be unknown responsibilities in case of delays, 
refunds, or lost luggage.  In sum, it is reasonable to believe that codeshare products are viewed 
differently than pure online products, and are thus nested accordingly. 
If product j is in group g, the utility of consumer i from choosing product j is given by 
ijigjiju εσσζδ )1( −++= ,     (3.1) 
where jδ  is the mean valuation across consumers of product j, igζ  is a random component of 
utility that is common to all products in group g, σ  measures the correlation of the consumers’ 
utility among products in same group, and ijε  is an idiosyncratic error term.  If 1=σ  there is a 
perfect correlation of preferences for products within a group and the products are perfect 
substitutes.  If 0=σ  there is no correlation of preferences, and the model becomes equivalent to 
the standard logit.  The model is consistent with consumer utility maximization for all values of 
σ  between 0 and 1 inclusive.  The mean valuation jδ  is determined by the price of the product 
( ), observed product characteristics ( ), and unobserved product characteristics (jp jx jξ ): 
jjjj px ξαβδ +−= ,      (3.2) 
where α  is a measure of the marginal utility of price and β  is a vector of parameters that 
measures the marginal utility of non-price product characteristics. 
Supply 
The supply methodology follows Nevo (2000) in which marginal costs are recovered 
using the estimated demand elasticities and assuming the pre-merger pricing conduct.  The new 
price equilibria are computed using the estimated demand, pre-merger marginal costs, and 
assuming the post-merger pricing conduct.  The post-merger equilibrium prices are compared to 
pre-merger prices to obtain estimates of predicted price increases as a result of the merger. 
Each firm f produces a set Ff of products.  Firm f has a variable profit of 
∑
∈
−=
fFj
jjjf qcp )(π ,      (3.3) 
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where  is the quantity of tickets for product j sold in the market (equal to the market demand 
for product j in equilibrium), and is the marginal cost incurred from offering product j. 
jq
jc
Firms choose prices to maximize profit, and multiproduct firms realize that lost sales on 
one product may be partly countered by higher sales on a substitute product.  The multiproduct 
Nash equilibrium is specified by the following system of J first order conditions: 
∑
∈
=+∂
∂−
fFk
j
j
k
kk sp
scp 0)(  for all j = 1,…,J.  (3.4) 
In matrix notation, the first order conditions are as follows: 
0)*. ()( =+ΔΩ×− scp ,     (3.5) 
where p, c, and s are 1×J  vectors of product prices, marginal costs, and predicted product shares 
respectively,Ω  is a  matrix which captures airline ownership structure of the products, .* is 
the operator for element-by-element matrix multiplication, and 
JJ ×
Δ  is a JJ ×  matrix of own and 
cross price effects (
j
j
p
s
∂
∂
 and 
j
k
p
s
∂
∂  respectively) for all products with the own-price effects on the 
main diagonal. 
The ownership structure  is a matrix of zeroes and ones that describes which products 
are owned by the same firm.  Specifically, 
Ω
0=Ω jk  means that product j and product k are 
owned by different firms while 1=Ω jk  means the two products are owned by the same firm. 
Product markups are separately estimated for each market and are defined as scp ×ΔΩ−=−= −1)*. (markups .     (3.6) 
The counterfactual simulation begins by specifying both a pre- and post-merger product 
ownership structure.  First, estimated marginal costs are recovered using the pre-merger product 
ownership structure as follows: sp ×ΔΩ+= −1)*. (ˆ prec ,     (3.7) 
where  is the pre-merger product ownership structure.  Next, using pre-merger marginal 
costs and assuming a post-merger ownership structure of 
preΩ
postΩ , the post-merger equilibrium 
prices can be calculated by searching for the new price vector 
*p
]p
 that satisfies 
[ spc ×ΔΩ−= −1** )(*. ˆ post .     (3.8) 
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The estimated post-merger equilibrium prices 
*p
d to are then compare
p
 to examine 
how the merger would affect prices according to the simulation. 
 
Based on the ownership matrix preΩ , different firms will separately and independently 
set prices for all product types within markets in which they offer products.  In the case of the 
 ownership matrix, the products in a market owned by the firms involved in a merger are all 
jointly priced by the new ticketing carrier formed by the simulated merger.
postΩ
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3.3.  Estimation 
Observed product shares are computed by 
M
q
S jj = , where M is the size of the market, 
defined as the population of the origin city.  It is well known in empirical industrial organization 
that the nested logit demand model results in the following estimating equation: 52
jgjjjj SpxSS ξσαβ ++−=− )ln( )ln()ln( /0 , 
where  is the observed share of the outside good and  is the observable share of product j 
in group g.  The error term
0S gjS /
jξ  represents product characteristics such as brand quality and 
promotional activities observed by consumers and firms but not by researchers.  The demand 
parameters of interest are ( )σβαθ ,,= . 
Airlines consider non-price product characteristics when setting the price.  Thus, 
instruments are needed because the product price will be correlated with the error term ( jξ ).  
Error term components, such as advertising, promotions, and consumer opinions of quality are 
market-specific and will likely have an effect on the price, but are unobservable to the 
econometrician.  For legitimate instruments, variables are needed that are associated with the 
price of the product but not the error term.  Without instruments, the price coefficient estimated 
will be inconsistent.  Further, non-price product characteristics in jξ  that affect the price may 
also affect the within-group share of the product, meaning that  is also endogenous. gjS /
                                                 
51 Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) provide another application of this model by studying horizontal mergers approved by 
the European Commission. 
52 For a more detailed analysis of the nested logit demand model, see Berry (1994). 
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Instruments 
Instruments used include the number of competitors in the market, the number of other 
products offered by the airline, characteristics of products offered by competitors, and itinerary 
distance.  Each instrument has an intuitive explanation for inclusion.  Supply theory predicts that 
the price of a product will be affected by the number and closeness of competitors in the market.  
For multiproduct firms, the Bertrand-Nash model assumes the airline will jointly set the prices of 
its products in that market.  Competing products with the same number of intermediate stops and 
similar levels of convenience are examined – the more similarities there are between competing 
products, less deviation is expected between prices of these products.  Itinerary distance is 
included since it is correlated with marginal cost and therefore influences price.53
The parameter estimates imply a negative marginal cost for some products when Two-
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) is used to estimate the demand equation.  To correct for this 
unrealistic outcome, demand is also estimated using constrained Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM), where the constraint is to impose non-negative marginal costs.  The 
constrained GMM estimation produces demand parameters that are consistent with utility 
maximization and static profit maximization.  The demand estimation procedure requires solving 
the following constrained optimization problem: 
[ ]
10   and   ,0)min( that such      
)'()')('( 1
<<≥−
−
σ
ξξθ
markup
ZZZZMin p  
where Z is the matrix of the control variables and instruments.  The procedure minimizes the 
objective function by choosing the set of parameters inθ .  The 2SLS estimates are used as a 
starting point for the GMM minimization procedure. 
3.4.  Data 
Data are gathered from the DB1B market survey, a quarterly 10% sample of all flight 
itineraries in the U.S. published by the U.S. Department of Transportation.  In this dataset, each 
observation is a flight itinerary including information on operating and ticketing carriers, fares, 
passengers, intermediate stops, origin and destination airport, and total itinerary distance.  The 
U.S. Census Bureau was also used to collect population data.  Data was collected for the third 
                                                 
53 See Gayle (2007) and Brown and Gayle (2009) for similar types of instruments. 
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quarter of 2008.  The data are restricted to include only itineraries in the contiguous 48 states, 
and foreign operating carriers such as Lufthansa and Royal Jordanian are eliminated.  
Observations that listed market fares of less than $25 were dropped – this helps avoid discounted 
fares that may be due to passengers using frequent-flyer miles.  Itineraries that had a price of 
more than 4 standard deviations above the market mean were also dropped from the sample.54
Because the objective of this paper is to explicitly analyze the effects of a number of 
mega-mergers, the dataset is restricted to contain only markets that are affected by at least one of 
the merger scenarios that are examined.  For example, a market that will be affected by the 
Alaskan/American merger is a market in which both Alaskan and American both offer products. 
Airlines effectively use yield management, leading to a dataset containing many repeat 
itineraries each listed as having passengers paying different fares.  To make the estimation more 
manageable, the data was collapsed by product – the quantity variable was found by aggregating 
passengers over a given itinerary-airline(s) combination, and price was found by taking the 
average fare paid by passengers on the aggregated itinerary.   In the collapsed data set, each 
itinerary-airline(s) combination appears only once.  Following Berry (1992), a product is only 
included if it was purchased by at least 20 passengers in the quarter.55  Ticketing carriers that 
made up less than 0.1% of the collapsed dataset were discarded, eliminating small carriers such 
as Allegiant Air and Virgin America. The final set of ticketing carriers is presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Airlines represented in the dataset 
Code Airline 
AA American Airlines 
AS Alaska Airlines 
B6 JetBlue Airways 
CO Continental Airlines 
DL Delta Airlines 
F9 Frontier Airlines 
FL Airtran Airways 
NW Northwest Airlines 
UA United Airlines 
US US Airways 
WN Southwest Airlines 
YX Midwest Airlines 
 
 
                                                 
54 This eliminated unusually high prices in the sample that may have been due to the use of private charter jets or 
data entry error.  One observation in the dataset had a market fare of more than $89,000. 
55 Berry (1992) used the more restrictive quantity of 90 passengers per quarter. 
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Product convenience is defined as itinerary distance divided by the direct flight distance 
between origin and destination.  Thus, the most convenient itinerary for a market would be a 
direct flight from origin to destination.  The hub_origin variable indicates whether the origin 
airport acts as a hub for the ticketing carrier.  A list of hubs is given in Table C.2 in Appendix C. 
Itineraries that were listed as having multiple ticketing carriers were dropped from the 
sample since each itinerary needed to have a single “owner” for the merger analysis.  The 
remaining single ticketing carrier products are then assigned a product type of pure online, 
traditional codeshare, or virtual codeshare. 56
Thus, observed non-price product characteristics ( ) include the following: 
convenience, a nonstop dummy equal to 1 if the flight is nonstop and equal to 0 otherwise,
jx
57 
nonstop miles between origin and destination, hub origin indicator, codeshare type, airline 
indicator, and fixed effects for origin and destination.  After cleaning and collapsing the original 
sample, the dataset used for analysis contains 16,934 observations across 2,173 markets.  There 
are 132 origin airports and 131 destination airports.  Summary statistics are presented in Table 
3.2. 
 
                                                 
56 To properly identify codeshare product types in the data, regional carriers are recoded to match their major carrier.  
If regional carriers were not recoded to their major carrier code, then products that have the major carrier as the 
ticketing carrier and associated regional carrier as operating carrier would mistakenly be counted as codeshare 
products since the operating and ticketing carrier codes would differ. 
57 The dataset itself contains the actual number of intermediate stops.  However, after the quantity and airline 
restrictions were imposed, only nonstop and one-stop itineraries remained.  Thus, nonstop = 0 means the itinerary 
has exactly one intermediate stop. 
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
Itinerary Distance 1747.23 681.7396 213 3567 
Nonstop Distance 1592.607 646.977 213 2724 
Nonstop Flight 0.123775 0.329334 0 1 
Quantity 145.2241 447.359 20 10704 
Price 224.3834 58.81689 81.27238 702.4503 
Hub origin 0.156549 0.363386 0 1 
Convenient 1.118138 0.170473 1 2.66004 
Pure Online 0.959549 0.197021 0 1 
Traditional Codeshare 0.013346 0.114755 0 1 
Virtual Codeshare 0.027105 0.162395 0 1 
ln(Sj) – ln(S0) -9.14022 1.300923 -13.7725 -4.63598 
ln(Sj/g) -2.02293 1.019073 -6.54302 0 
 
 
3.5.  Results 
Demand Parameters 
The demand regression results are presented in Table 3.3.  Immediately noticed is a non-
significant positive price coefficient in the OLS regression.  This illustrates the endogeneity of 
this variable and the need for instruments.  In the 2SLS and GMM regressions, the coefficient 
has the appropriate negative sign, implying that higher prices are associated with lower levels of 
utility, ceteris paribus. 
The coefficient on ( )gjS /ln  is the estimate forσ .  All estimates of σ are between 0 and 1 
with significance, implying the model is consistent with utility maximization.  However, the 
magnitude differences (the OLS estimate is four times the magnitude of the 2SLS estimate) again 
illustrates the need to use instruments with this endogenous variable.  To test the validity of the 
instruments, both endogenous variables were regressed against the instruments using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS), and a Hausman test was performed.  The results, shown in Appendix C, 
confirm that each instrument is strongly correlated with both endogenous variables, with one 
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exception.  Hausman tests shown in Table 3.3 also reject the exogeneity of price and ( )gjS /ln , 
implying that instruments are needed.58
Table 3.3 Demand Regression Results 
  OLS  2SLS  GMM 
Variable          
Price (100s)  0.0075 (0.0110)  -2.3012** (0.6413)  -1.6905** (0.0003) 
ln(Sj/g)  0.6491** (0.0062)  0.1616* (0.0658)  0.1486** (0.0002) 
Convenient  -0.5151** (0.0310)  -0.7294** (0.0906)  -1.2372** (0.0004) 
Nonstop  0.8180** (0.0179)  1.7840** (0.0591)  1.6203** (0.0005) 
Nonstop miles (1,000s)  -0.1192** (0.0144)  0.9983** (0.3553)  0.7239** (0.0003) 
Hub_origin  0.1283** (0.0152)  0.6048** (0.1169)  0.4413** (0.0003) 
Traditional Codeshare  -1.7016** (0.0422)  -1.4838** (0.3141)  -1.1106** (0.0007) 
Virtual Codeshare  -1.6530** (0.0310)  -1.3548** (0.1159)  -1.2569** (0.0006) 
Constant  -6.7737** (0.2150)  -1.8545 (1.3471)  -2.0974** (0.0025) 
          
R-squared   0.8021   0.1694    
Wu-Hausman F test:  2240** F(2,16651)       
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
chi-sq test  3590** Chi-sq(2) 
 
  
 
  
The regressions include a full set of fixed effects for airline, origin, and destination even though the coefficients are not reported. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
*   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
The coefficient on nonstop is positive and significant in all regressions.  Passengers 
prefer direct flights from origin to destination – any stop during the itinerary leads to lower levels 
of utility.  The convenient variable has the expected negative coefficient in all regressions.  
Flights that fly any path other than directly to the destination are expected to be associated with 
disutility.  The nonstop_miles coefficient is positive, and this makes sense when viewed in 
relationship to the outside good substitute.  The longer the distance is between origin and 
destination, the more desirable flying becomes relative to another form of transportation.59
The hub_origin dummy is positive, indicating a preference for flying an airline out of its 
hub airport.  An airline may be able to organize more convenient gates and departure times when 
flying out of its hub, therefore making the itinerary more desirable.  Borenstein (2005) and Berry 
                                                 
58 The Hausman test presents a null hypothesis of price and ( )gjS /ln  being exogenous.  The Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
chi-square test with two degrees of freedom rejects the null hypothesis with over 99.99% confidence. 
59 Berry and Jia (2009) state that airline demand is hill-shaped in distance.  Demand increases with distance of travel 
as other substitutes become infeasible, but only up to a point where extremely long flights become unpleasant. 
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and Jia (2009) find evidence of a decreasing “hub premium”.  Consumers may realize 
advantages to choosing a hub airline, but those benefits could be disappearing in recent years.  
Service gaps between hub and non-hub products may have narrowed, or perhaps loyalty 
programs have become less valued. 
Consistent with the results in Brown and Gayle (2009), the traditional codeshare variable 
has a negative and significant coefficient.  Note that the “left out” product type category is pure 
online, indicating a traditional codeshare product has a lower demand relative to a pure online 
product.  While there are multiple operating carriers on a traditional codeshare itinerary, the 
double markup may be eliminated because of a single ticketing carrier.  Thus, the negative sign 
may be capturing some other unobserved handiness effects of this type of product.  The itinerary 
for a pure online product is relatively streamlined; an airline can organize its own planes and 
schedules to minimize layover time and efficiently organize gates at airports.  With a traditional 
codeshare flight, a passenger may be more likely to experience longer layovers or long journeys 
through the airport to find a different gate.  Even though codeshare partners try to coordinate 
their efforts in this manner, the negative coefficient on traditional codeshare suggests that these 
coordination efforts are not as efficient relative to pure online products.  The coefficient on 
virtual codeshare is negative and significant in all regressions.  This is supported by the previous 
literature of Ito and Lee (2007) and Armantier and Richard (2008) summarized earlier. 
Merger Analysis 
The main objective of the merger analysis is to study the effects of the Delta / Northwest 
merger as well as other potential mergers.  Summary statistics for variables of interest are 
displayed in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4 Summary Statistics for Merger Variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pre-merger variables      
Price 16934 224.3834 58.8169 81.2724 702.4503 
Recovered marginal costs 16934 171.6423 58.7982 22.1166 651.0165 
Markups 16934 52.7411 2.3352 50.3699 59.7315 
Post-merger estimated 
product prices*      
Delta / Northwest 16934 224.7467 58.7298 81.3303 702.4503 
American / Alaska 16934 224.7581 58.7353 81.3303 702.4503 
United / Continental 16934 225.0405 58.8564 81.3303 702.4507 
United / Continental / US 
Airways 16934 225.4365 58.9388 81.3303 702.4507 
All mergers occur 16934 225.4479 58.9442 81.3303 702.4507 
Monopoly 16934 230.9215 58.7919 81.3361 710.2069 
Post-merger estimated 
product price increases (%)**      
Delta / Northwest 4833 0.6522 0.8526 0 6.0726 
American / Alaska 2316 0.0377 0.2503 0 3.9000 
United / Continental 4776 0.4423 0.5675 0 6.5327 
United / Continental / 
US Airways 6320 0.8035 0.7280 0 6.5518 
All mergers occur 13469 0.6209 0.7698 0 6.5518 
Monopoly 16934 3.1103 1.3949 0.0001 10.6844 
* Note that the AA / AS, the UA / CO, and the UA / CO / US merger simulations are performed assuming 
that Delta and Northwest have already merged. 
** The predicted percentage price increases are only summarized over products in which the particular 
merger had a direct effect.  For example, mean AA / AS predicted price increase only includes AA and AS 
products.  The predicted price increases for the "monopoly" row were calculated using the full dataset. 
 
 
The average itinerary price before the merger is $224.38, and it appears that the average 
prices increase only negligibly.  However, there is a large range of price increases for each 
simulated merger.  The predicted price increases show the Delta / Northwest merger alone causes 
an average predicted price increase of just 0.30% which is close to the result of 0.54% found by 
Brown and Gayle (2009).  Interestingly, the situation outlined by Congressman Oberstar in 
which the industry is dominated by four or five mega-carriers (all mergers occur) doesn’t give 
mean predicted price increases much different than any single merger combined with DL/NW.  
As expected, the monopoly simulation gives the largest predicted price increases.  Overall, the 
summary statistics alone are not sufficient to make conclusions about any merger, and it is 
important to examine the markets directly affected by each merger and look at specific factors 
that may cause larger price increases in certain markets compared to others, rather than just 
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comparing means across the whole dataset.  In addition, it is useful to examine the distribution of 
predicted price increases rather than just the means. 
To get a further detailed analysis of the possible effects of the merger, the predicted price 
increases are regressed as a function of product characteristics to examine what may account for 
varying predicted price increases among different products.  The results are shown in Table 3.5. 
The share of passengers owned in a market by the merging firms has a positive effect on 
the predicted price increase, although the values are economically insignificant.  In all 
simulations, the coefficients on nonstop and hub_origin are negative and significant.  Firms 
could be reluctant to raise prices on their most desirable itineraries in a given market due to fear 
that a consumer may choose a competitor's product.  Another possible reason to keep hub prices 
lower would be to gain market shares in a given region. 
Nonstop flight distance is negatively correlated with predicted price increases.  Airlines 
may be more reluctant to raise prices on longer flights, possibly because of an increased 
likelihood of competing carriers being able to offer itineraries with similar convenience.60  The 
convenience variable by itself seems to be merger-specific in terms of its effect on predicted 
price increases.  The three largest merger scenarios on the right side of Table 3.5 give a positive 
coefficient, implying that inconvenient itineraries experience higher predicted price increases.  
Inconvenient itineraries are often relatively cheaper to begin with, and an airline that has gained 
market power via a merger might find it more profitable to raise the price of the relatively 
cheaper products by more (in terms of percent). 
                                                 
60 I thank an anonymous referee for this insight. 
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Table 3.5 Decomposition of Predicted Price Increases Among Merger Products 
 DL/NW 
DL/NW + 
AA/AS 
DL/NW + 
UA/CO 
DL/NW + 
UA/CO/US 
All 
mergers Monopoly 
Passenger % Share of 
Merging Firms 0.0126** 0.0049** 0.0061** 0.0048** 0.0017**  
  (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)  
Convenient 0.0328 -0.0904 -0.1670** 0.2843** 0.2746** 0.5635** 
  (0.0584) (0.0469) (0.0443) (0.0452) (0.0409) (0.0567) 
Nonstop -0.3635** -0.2149** -0.3787** -0.3912** -0.3025** -1.7035** 
  (0.0399) (0.0267) (0.0281) (0.0267) (0.0225) (0.0289) 
Nonstop Miles 
(thousands) -0.1545** -0.1076** -0.2428** -0.1924** -0.1242** -0.7914** 
  (0.0368) (0.0226) (0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0193) (0.0255) 
Hub Origin -0.3760** -0.2853** -0.0833** -0.0903** -0.1498** -0.5263** 
  (0.0606) (0.0295) (0.0297) (0.0260) (0.0214) (0.0270) 
# of Pre-Merger 
Competitors in Market -0.0389** -0.0805** -0.0586** -0.0460** -0.0490** 0.2137** 
  (0.0117) (0.0088) (0.0080) (0.0081) (0.0074) (0.0101) 
Constant -0.1259 0.1030 0.5554 -0.0109 -0.2238 1.7284** 
  (0.4022) (0.2917) (0.2841) (0.2962) (0.2576) (0.3920) 
       
# Observations 4833 7149 8736 11153 13469 16934 
R-squared 0.4776 0.4157 0.3404 0.1952 0.1877 0.3894 
       
Regressions include a full set of origin and destination fixed effects, although these coefficients are not reported 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
*   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
 
 
The number of competitors in a pre-merger market has a negative effect on predicted 
price increases caused by the mergers.  A larger number of non-merging competitors would help 
keep prices lower even while rivalry is decreasing.  The exception is the monopoly simulation – 
here, prices are actually predicted to increase more when there is a larger number of competitors 
in the pre-merger market.  This makes sense intuitively – if a market was noncompetitive in the 
sense that prices were already high and there were very few pre-merger competitors in the 
market, prices would not be expected to increase as much (in terms of percent) relative to a more 
competitive market if both markets were to become monopolized.  The constant term also 
increases greatly in size when the monopoly is simulated, showing once again the larger 
predicted price changes caused by extreme changes in product ownership and market power.  
The monopoly simulation is the only scenario in which the constant term is significant and 
positive. 
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Finally, I examined the distribution of the price increases.  Specifically, I analyzed ranges 
of predicted price increases for products directly affected by each merger.  In addition, the 
products are then weighted by passenger quantities to find the percentage of passengers who 
experience various predicted price increases.  The distributions appear below in Table 3.6. 
The distribution of predicted price increases and the percentage of passengers 
experiencing these increases gives a much clearer picture compared to just examining mean 
predicted price increases across all products.  The mean predicted price increase for each merger 
is small because of the skewed distribution toward prices that are expected to increase less than 
one percent.  However, there are still some products which experience noticeable price changes; 
in the “all mergers” scenario, 6.18% of the products are expected to have a price increase of 
greater than 2%.  When the predicted price increases are weighted by quantity, the skew toward 
the smallest price increases becomes even larger.  For the "all mergers" scenario, even though 
6.18% of the products are expected to have price increases greater than 2%, these products only 
represent 2.48% of the passengers that choose a product affected by any of the mergers. 
Table 3.6 Distribution of Predicted Price Increases 
Predicted Price  
 
DL / NW AA /AS UA / CO UA / CO / US 
All 
Mergers Monopoly
Increases        
  Number of Products 
Less than 1%  3696 2289 4218 4298 10278 1507 
1% - 2%  721 10 442 1625 2359 1312 
2% - 3%  294 14 84 312 622 4384 
3% - 4%  90 3 21 59 152 5931 
Greater than 4%  32 0 11 26 58 3800 
        
  Percent of Products 
Less than 1%  76.47 98.83 88.32 68.01 76.31 8.90 
1% - 2%  14.92 0.43 9.25 25.71 17.51 7.75 
2% - 3%  6.08 0.60 1.76 4.94 4.62 25.89 
3% - 4%  1.86 0.13 0.44 0.93 1.13 35.02 
Greater than 4%  0.66 0.00 0.23 0.41 0.43 22.44 
        
  Percent of Passengers 
Less than 1%  88.78 98.74 92.32 82.74 88.86 30.94 
1% - 2%  7.92 0.61 6.99 14.16 8.66 17.06 
2% - 3%  2.08 0.64 0.49 2.49 1.87 19.79 
3% - 4%  1.01 0.02 0.13 0.42 0.47 20.39 
Greater than 4%  0.20 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.14 11.82 
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Further breaking down the predicted price increases yields results showing a large 
passenger share owned by the merging firms in markets where prices are expected to increase the 
most.  In the Delta/Northwest merger, 25 of the 32 products which are expected to have a price 
increase of greater than 4% are in markets where Delta and Northwest have a combined 50% or 
greater pre-merger passenger share, with 17 of the 25 products having a combined 100% 
passenger share.  In the American / Alaska merger simulation, 15 of the 17 products with a 
predicted price increase of more than 2% are in markets where the combined American / Alaska 
passenger share is over 75%.  Finally, in the United / Continental / US Airways merger 
simulation, 22 of the 26 products that are predicted to have the largest price increases are in 
markets where the three firms combine for over 75% of the pre-merger passenger share.  
Analogously, lower pre-merger passenger shares are associated with lower predicted price 
increases.  The average pre-merger combined market share for Delta / Northwest products that 
are expected to have price increases of less than 1% is only 6.3%.  For American / Alaska, this 
combined share is 6.5%.  Overall, it is clear to see that higher pre-merger passenger shares 
among merging firms are associated with higher predicted price increases. 
3.6.  Conclusions 
This paper estimates a structural demand model for airline products and studies the 
potential effects of the Delta/Northwest merger in conjunction with other possible merger 
scenarios.  Consistent with previous literature, the demand results show that passengers prefer 
low-priced, pure online, nonstop itineraries.  In addition, passengers prefer products that are 
offered from an airline's hub airport, perhaps to due to higher convenience in gate locations and 
departure times. 
The merger results suggest that, on average, the Delta / Northwest merger will not cause 
significant price increases on average, even when the scenario is modeled with zero cost 
efficiencies.  Similar results hold when other codeshare partner mergers are simulated 
concurrently with the DL/NW merger.  Only when the simulation models a monopoly merger do 
the predicted price increases become larger on average, with particularly large maximum values.  
However, the distribution of the predicted price increases associated with any of the mergers is 
large, with a small number of products experiencing noticeable price increases.  When the 
products are weighted by passenger quantities, I find that a very small number of passengers are 
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expected to be affected by the largest predicted price increases.  Finally, the largest price 
increases tend to be associated with products that are in products in which the merging firms 
have a large pre-merger passenger share. 
Weaknesses of the model 
Some weaknesses of the results can arise from the model.  First, when the estimate of σ  
is relatively close to zero, approximately yielding the standard logit demand model, this type of 
simulation is a way to translate market share data into predicted price increases.61  As a result, 
larger predicted price increases are often predicted when both firms involved in a merger have a 
relatively large market share, independent of the degree of substitutability between the 
products.62  However, using higher-ordered nests (nesting by number of intermediate stops and 
codeshare type) may help correct for this problem.  Second, even though fixed effects for origin 
and destination are included in the demand model, it may be useful to model separate demand 
functions for various regions and markets rather than a single model for the entire industry.  
Third, an exclusive reliance on the discrete choice nested logit demand model comes with a cost.  
For example, Peters (2006) used merger simulation techniques with the benefit of having actual 
post merger data at hand, and found large differences in some cases between predicted prices and 
actual post-merger prices.  He theorized that the difference could be caused by unobservable 
supply-side factors such as changes in firm conduct or marginal costs.  Armantier and Richard 
(2006 and 2008) theorize that using a random coefficients logit demand model may yield more 
precise estimates, but it is much more tedious to estimate.  However, using a random coefficients 
model, or perhaps dealing with the large airline fare variations in a different way (rather than 
averaging) may eliminate the need for using a constrained GMM which forces positive marginal 
costs.  Fourth, while this paper provides an exercise in simulating a merger and estimating price 
increases, it cannot give any information about the likelihood of any of the mergers actually 
occurring.  The mergers simulated in this paper were chosen to follow the same precedent as 
Delta / Northwest; firms that are already in a codeshare alliance together form a new single firm 
due to a merger. 
                                                 
61 See Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) 
62 I thank an anonymous referee for this critique. 
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Policy Implications & Future Research 
While the predicted price increases are relatively small on average, the distribution is 
large, and the maximum price increases are much larger than the average.  If any of the 
simulated mergers were actually to occur, the DoJ may want to monitor markets of interest, such 
as markets with a smaller number of competitors, a smaller number of products offered, and 
markets where the merging firms have a relatively large pre-merger passenger and product share. 
Future research will be focused mainly with dealing with the aforementioned weaknesses 
of the model.  Specifically, it may be of interest to estimate multiple demand equations for 
various markets and use a random coefficients logit model. 
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 Appendix A - Three Airline Single Market Example 
Assume that in the pre-alliance period there are only three pure online substitute 
differentiated products (1, 2, and 3), and only three non-allied competing airlines in the market: 
Delta, Northwest, and American, where Delta offers product 1, Northwest offers product 2, and 
American offers product 3.  In the post-alliance period, Delta and Northwest are alliance partners 
and may offer virtual codeshare products, while American is non-allied. 
Strategic Interaction in the Pre-Alliance Period 
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Furthermore, product markups are given by: 
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Strategic Interaction in the Post-Alliance Period 
The post-alliance period for any given market can take on one of two distinct scenarios:  
(1) a post-alliance market in which Delta and Northwest compete and virtual codeshare together 
(v = 1); (2) a post-alliance market in which Delta and Northwest compete but do not virtual 
codeshare together (v = 0).  For simplicity, suppose that product 7 is the only virtual codeshare 
product that is introduced in the market in the event that Delta and Northwest codeshare together, 
where Delta is the ticketing carrier and Northwest the operating carrier. 
Strategic interaction in market when v = 1: 
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Furthermore, product markups are given by: 
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Strategic interaction in market when v = 0: 
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Furthermore, product markups are given by: 
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 Appendix B - Additional Chapter 2 Tables 
Table B.1 Instrument Validity Test 
 Dependent Variable 
 Price (hundreds)  ln(Sj_g) 
Variable      
Nest_sum_convenient -0.103 (0.081)  1.498** (0.106) 
Nest_sum_interstop -0.531** (0.026)  -1.015** (0.034) 
Nest_convenient -0.061** (0.011)  -0.421** (0.015) 
Nest_interstop 0.082** (0.007)  0.352** (0.009) 
N_comp -0.028** (0.003)  -0.008* (0.004) 
N_multi -0.052** (0.010)  -0.069** (0.012) 
comp_distance 0.684** (0.103)  0.885** (0.135) 
close_comp -0.005 (0.012)  -0.061** (0.015) 
Itinerary distance / 1000 0.412** (0.009)  -0.109** (0.012) 
constant 2.022** (0.078)  -1.169** (0.102) 
      
R-squared 0.275   0.579  
Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
*   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
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Table B.2 Post-Merger Data Demand Results 
“Leisure” Type   
Price (hundreds) -0.946** (0.003) 
Convenient -0.546** (0.049) 
Nonstop 1.606** (0.032) 
Constant -0.946** (0.003) 
   
“Business” Type   
Price (hundreds) -1.454** (0.024) 
Convenient -0.790** (0.039) 
Nonstop 2.124** (0.021) 
Constant -0.866** (0.038) 
   
Hub Origin 0.412** (0.001) 
Virtual Codeshare -1.261** (0.002) 
Traditional Codeshare -0.373** (0.004) 
Spring 0.041** (0.001) 
Summer -2.780** (0.083) σ  0.120** (0.001) 
Lλ  0.601** (0.020) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
*   Statistically significant at the 5% level 
** Statistically significant at the 1% level 
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 Dependent Variable 
*   Statistically si
** Statistically si
 
Appendix C - Additional Chapter 3 Tables 
 
 
 
Table C.1 Instrument Validity Test 
 Price  ln(Sj_g) 
Variable      
Nest_sum_convenient 0.2486** (0.0603)  2.6086** (0.0798)
Nest_sum_interstop -0.3967** (0.0288)  -1.4823** (0.0381)
Nest_conv  (0.0105)enient -0.0879** (0.0079)  -0.5073**
Nest_interst  (0.0114)op 0.1055** (0.0086)  0.3782**
N_comp  (0.0030) -0.0092** (0.0023)  -0.0122**
N_mu 6 (0.0060)lti -0.0218** (0.0045)  0.006
comp_distan  (0.0520)ce 0.4780** (0.0393)  0.2384**
close_comp  (0.0051) -0.0262** (0.0039)  0.0799**
Itin Distance  (0.0102)/ 1000 0.4271** (0.0077)  -0.1303**
consta  (0.0756)nt 1.7805** (0.0572)  -2.2756**
   
R-squared 0.2353  0.5547 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
gnificant at the 5% level 
gnificant at the 1% level 
 
 Table C.2 List of Hubs for each Airline 
Airline Hubs Airline Hubs 
BOS - Logan International, Boston BWI - Baltimore/Washington International 
DFW - Dallas/Fort Worth International CLT - Charlotte Douglas 
JFK - John F Kennedy International, New York IND - Indianapolis International 
LAX - Los Angeles International LAX - Los Angeles International 
MIA - Miami International PHL - Philadelphia International 
ORD - Chicago O'Hare International PIT - Pittsburgh International 
RDU - Raleigh-Durham International SFO - San Francisco International 
American Airlines 
STL - Lambert St. Louis International 
US Airways 
SYR - Syracuse Hancock International 
BOI - Boise Air Terminal/Gowen Field BNA - Nashville International Alaska Airlines SEA - Seattle/Tacoma International BWI - Baltimore/Washington International 
JetBlue Airways JFK - John F Kennedy International, New York DAL - Dallas Love Field 
CLE - Hopkins International, Cleveland DEN - Denver International 
EWR - Newark Liberty International HOU - William P Hobby, Houston Continental Airlines IAH - George Bush Intercontinental, Houston LAS - McCarran International, Las Vegas 
ATL - Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International LAX - Los Angeles International 
CVG - Cincinnati/ Northern Kentucky MCO - Orlando International 
DFW - Dallas/Fort Worth International MDW - Chicago Midway Delta Airlines 
SLC - Salt Lake City International OAK - Oakland International 
Frontier Airlines DEN - Denver International PHL - Philadelphia International 
ATL - Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International PHX - Sky Harbor International, Phoenix Airtran Airways MCO - Orlando International SAN - San Diego 
DTW - Detroit Metropolitan 
Southwest Airlines 
TPA - Tampa International 
MEM - Memphis International Midwest Airlines MKE - General Mitchell International, Milwaukee Northwest Airlines MSP - Minneapolis/St. Paul International  
DEN - Denver International  
IAD - Washington Dulles International  
LAX - Los Angeles International  
ORD - Chicago O'Hare International  
United Airlines 
SFO - San Francisco International  
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